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Summary
China is the subject of Western criticism for its supposed disregard 
of the rules-based international order. Such a charge implies that 
China is unilateralist. The aim in this study is to explain how China 
does in fact have a multilateral approach to international relations. 
China’s core idea of a community of shared future of humanity 
shows that it is aware of the need for a universal foundation for 
world order. The Research Report focuses on explaining the Chinese 
approach to multilateralism from its own internal perspective, with 
Chinese philosophy and history shaping its view of the nature of rules, 
rights, law, and of institutions which should shape relationships. 
A number of case studies show how the Chinese perspectives are 
implemented, such as with regards to development finance, infrastructure 
projects (especially the Belt and Road Initiative), shaping new 
international organisations (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank), climate change, cyber-regulation and Chinese participation in 
the United Nations in the field of human rights and peacekeeping.
Looking at critical Western opinion of this activity, we find speculation around 
Chinese motives. This is why a major emphasis is placed on a hermeneutic 
approach to China which explains how it sees its intentions. The heart of 
the Research Report is an exploration of the underlying Chinese philosophy 
of rulemaking, undertaken in a comparative perspective to show how 
far it resembles or differs from the Western philosophy of rulemaking.
Keywords
multilateralism versus unilateralism; rules-based international order; 
community of shared future of humanity; Confucian philosophy of 
rulemaking and right/law; international law; Belt and Road Initiative; 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; development finance; climate 
change; human rights; peacekeeping; global cyber-regulation. 
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Executive Summary
The central issue addressed in this Research Report is to develop an internal 
perspective on China’s approaches to multilateralism: a ‘hermeneutic’ of 
Chinese intentions. The Western perspective is an external one, based 
on observations of Chinese conduct and practice from which China’s 
intentions in international relations are extrapolated. Problematically, the 
West also approaches China primarily from a realist paradigm and a self-
understanding of being a community of values (values of democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law) that form the indicators by which to judge China. 
Getting closer to Chinese intentions through an alternative, internal 
perspective involves extensive reflections on Chinese theories of 
international law and international relations, Chinese views of the nature 
of rules and social organisation, and the place of the individual in the 
community as well as nations in world society. The question of how far 
theory informs Chinese institutional practice is explored through the Chinese 
perspective on a range of issues such as international law, human rights, 
climate change, cybersecurity, and international development finance. 
This is contrasted with Western critical reflections on Chinese practices 
and conduct, mainly from an external perspective. It is hoped that this 
exercise will highlight possible reasons for mutual misunderstandings and 
encourage constructive dialogue among Chinese and Western thinkers.
Four key aspects underline the theoretical foundations of China’s 
approaches to multilateralism, spanning its engagement with international 
law and the rules-based international order in terms of its own renewed 
Confucian engagement with modernity.
1. On international law, China says it adheres to the United Nations (UN) 
Charter, its central principle of the sovereign equality of states and 
the principle of non-intervention. However, it sees that historically, and 
up to China’s readmission to the UN in 1971, the West has not applied 
international law equally and fairly to China. Further, China does not 
believe that international law provides all the answers to the future 
development of world society. Instead, the way forward is to seek 
consensus while reserving differences, following the view of Zhou en Lai.
2. Liberal democracy and the rule of law is the standard that the West 
wants to see universally applied by all nations. In recognition of this, 
China offers its own vision of world society, namely adhering to the path 
of peaceful development and constructing a ‘community of common 
destiny’. The report examines critical Chinese reflections on these 
Western standards in terms of an alternative Confucian philosophy 
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which China considers to be more appropriate to modern world 
society. This includes the idea of a hybrid democracy mainly managed 
by experts, education in a virtue ethics learned from the family and 
community, and a long-term global future shaped by compassion.
3. Within the general perspective of traditional Confucianism, Chinese 
anthropology reflects on differences in Chinese and Western 
concepts of the ethical individual. The absolute, transcendent and 
innate rights of the individual, as evolved through Western theology 
and philosophy, are contrasted with the Chinese vision of organic 
self-development of societies and of persons within societies. Rules 
and practices, known as rites, are a product of slow accumulation of 
habits that develop through interlocking networks of human relations.
4. The final issue is the relationship between the rule of law and the 
rule of virtue in Chinese public life or, in other words, official and 
representative views. Both are regarded as essential and need to 
work together in parallel. This means understanding the relation 
of state to civil society. While there is a place for civil society and 
non-governmental organisation in China, the state remains the primary 
voice. However, official Chinese thinking draws attention not only to 
the nation state but to the construction of a community of a shared 
future of humanity. As previously described, this is achieved organically 
through interlocking networks of relationships at a global level.
The international human rights order is the central area of contestation 
between China and the West. This report recognises that the Western view 
that human rights in China are limited is linked to the one-party-dominated 
Chinese communist state, and the Chinese system of government will always 
be regarded with a lack of trust by the West. It also accepts that, while civil 
society and non-governmental activity are encouraged in China, the state 
always remains in the driving seat. Opinions considered here recognize 
that democratisation in China has been very slow. Nonetheless, there is 
place to understand that there are Chinese approaches to human rights, 
just as there are different approaches to human rights in Western and other 
countries. This is seen in the areas of state sovereignty and intervention, 
the issue of cyber-sovereignty versus freedom of the web, the concept 
of developmental peace in the global South and, relatedly, the struggle 
over the meaning of human rights in the UN Human Rights Council.
With respect to sovereignty and foreign intervention, these appear 
completely prohibited in UN resolutions. However, there is ambiguity 
around the term ‘intervention’. For the West, it means armed intervention 
and material assistance to armed subversion – but that is all. For China 
(and others), intervention also covers propaganda against a state with 
a view to undermining its authority and social stability. This tension 
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points to cultural differences in the nature of discourse. Fact-based 
criticism following the logic of rationalism is always justified in the West 
while China and other Eastern cultures principally uphold respect for the 
other person with communication as subjective and personal. Debates 
about intervention and other topics are all affected by this issue. 
Concerning cyber-sovereignty and the freedom of the World Wide 
Web, China accepts in principle the place of civil society and the 
private sector but expresses concern about the global media power 
of the internet and Western technology companies which are difficult 
to control publicly. In this area, China favours very precise regulation 
at the inter-state level through international treaties. The West 
continues to believe in the self-regulatory role for the private sector 
and, although aware of the possibility of private abuse of power, has a 
much narrower concept of how much that power requires regulation.
The Human Rights Council is a forum where debate and controversy 
on human rights have raged since the beginning of this century. Both 
sides see that there is no theoretical dispute about the catalogue of 
human rights and even their content. The fierce disagreement lies in the 
questions of interpretation and implementation. China insists that this is a 
domestic matter for the state to determine – a view that the West believes 
effectively robs the concept of human rights of any meaning. This debate 
is not helped by the fact that Chinese legal specialists admit they are 
not yet adept at the conceptual development of cultural artifacts alien 
to their history. Some very astute Western specialists are aware of this 
feature of Chinese human rights discourse. In any case, as has just been 
mentioned, Chinese (and other Far Eastern) methods of discourse are 
not yet accustomed to the abrasive character of what, for the Western 
mind, is simply a logical, factual argument of an impersonal nature.
Developmental peace is another concrete area of disagreement which 
concerns whether, in the context of the global South, economic rights 
have priority over political rights. It is recognised that the Chinese do not 
formally prioritise economic rights, but in practice they consider peace 
and stability in the global South to be also a matter of sound economic 
infrastructure and stable social development. China is very active in UN 
peacekeeping, to which it commits its military, but it still does not prioritise 
the development of political institutions, considering this exclusively a 
matter of domestic concern. This issue plays out in the work of the Human 
Rights Council, and is also relevant to the topic of development finance.
The nature of rulemaking is a central question that Xiaotong Fei, the 
founder of modern Chinese sociology, helps us to understand beyond 
the parameters of Chinese compliance with a rules-based international 
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order. He shows how a Western concept of the individual with innate 
rights shaped ideas of rule, law, and political organisation. As the 
individual is created by God and not a product of society, law is therefore 
impersonal and adjudicated by impartial tribunals. The existence, and 
membership, of political organisation rests upon consent of members 
who satisfy the conditions laid down by agreed legal terms. 
Fei contrasts this with the traditional Chinese approach which 
assumes the individual is born into and shaped by the community. 
Rules, or rites, express the habits and practices of the community. 
They can be extremely detailed and numerous, appropriate to the 
Chinese context and not to be formulated as abstract, universal 
rules. Most of all, the continued existence of the rites depends on the 
continued cooperation of participants in the practices or activities. 
Various aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) demonstrate the 
probable continued presence of Chinese social organisation according 
to Fei’s explanations. The BRI is taken as characteristic of how China 
is developing multilateral institutionalism now and likely in the future. 
To Western eyes its practices must appear amorphous. The terms of 
cooperation agreements are left very general, depending upon continued 
collaboration between the relevant parties and without independent 
adjudication of clear norms. These hives of activity are expected to generate 
stable networks of large numbers of participants creating reliable and 
effective progress. There is also a lack of institutional hierarchy that might 
be expected in a Western international organisation. Instead, this may 
represent a hub and spoke relationship with China at the centre, reproducing 
the classical imperial Chinese Tributary System. While the initiative always 
comes from China, evidence from the participants is that mutuality remains 
critical. The goal is a networking, a building up of webs of continuing 
relationships which Fei would consider an essential feature of Chinese 
social organisation. This of course draws criticism from Western observers.
Tensions between the West and China concerning Chinese multilateralism 
can be seen in the specific case of development finance. Chinese innovation 
in multilateralism is a complex picture. The Asian International Investment 
Bank (AIIB) clearly represents a Chinese wish to move within the existing 
system of international development banking but, at the same time, achieve 
incremental changes. It closely follows the Western concept of organisation 
and rules and has achieved a great deal of Western participation. The 
AIIB quota system for voting is based upon gross national product (GNP) 
and has a special quota balance for Asian members intended to assure 
more democratic decision-making in banking policy. This is therefore 
intended to give borrowers a larger role in the actual granting of loans. 
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At the same time, the AIIB relies upon its credibility in world financial 
markets and adheres to usual standards of financial soundness. It does not 
provoke much hostile criticism even though it departs from the institutional 
model of the World Bank and other regional development banks.
The BRI and China’s general development financing policies do, on 
the other hand, receive much Western criticism. The concept of debt 
diplomacy signifies that China uses development financing to garner 
diplomatic support. Evidence shows that voting on China’s proposed 
resolutions in the Human Rights Council corresponds to financial 
dependency on China. These resolutions concern prioritising economic 
and social aspects of development over the civil and political.
More fundamentally, the aim of this report is to contribute an internal 
Chinese perspective on Chinese activity. In this context of development 
finance, external Western criticism equates the amorphous character 
of Chinese policy with a lack of transparency. It is seen as typically 
opaque and heightens suspicions of a hegemonic strategy. Other lesser 
criticisms maintain that China enters debt diplomacy either to keep 
its options open or because it is not certain of its goals. Nevertheless, 
finance serves China’s productive surplus and its need for infrastructure 
and natural resources. These Western perspectives are all forms of 
realism as they assume all states, including China, act only to advance 
their own interests. These arguments evidence profound philosophical 
disagreement which it is difficult to resolve in the short term.
Climate change is an area where China’s cooperation with the international 
community is essential to successful policy and regulation. It is clear 
there are very serious problems of accentuating global warming to 
which China is contributing significantly. A particular problem for China 
is that its economy is still expanding, and it argues that it is a developing 
country. Regardless, China is still party to the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change and has committed itself to net zero carbon emissions 
by 2060 and to peak its emissions by 2030. In the lead-up to the 
COP26 climate conference in autumn 2021, it is overshadowed by wider 
geopolitical tensions, particularly in China–US climate negotiations. 
This report intends to contribute to reflections on China’s approaches to 
multilateralism by adding an internal dimension to the already well-known 
criticisms of China’s contemporary practice of international relations. This is 
not a matter of simply reiterating self-serving Chinese official declarations as 
to the merits of its policies. Instead, this study probes deeper into intellectual, 
academic explorations of possible long-term, civilisational foundations for 
Chinese behaviour. It is hoped that this can add to the debate about China’s 
role in the world. There is an urgent need to deepen and enhance knowledge 
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about China. In an increasingly divided and uncertain world, it is more 
important than ever to encourage more informal dialogue among Chinese 
and Western academics and other thinkers across the civilizational divide. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Chinese multilateralism today
Multilateralism is the practice of states working together with two or more 
countries to achieve common goals in international relations. For its part, 
China has been an active member of international organisations and 
multilateral institutions in recent years. China is currently deeply engaged 
with the universal international organisation of the United Nations (UN) 
and other regional groups including the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Forum on 
China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Latin America, East Central Europe 
(16+1), the East Asian Regional Trade Partnership, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CIA) 
with the European Union (EU), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
This is not an exhaustive list of China’s multilateral engagements.
Multilateral activity would normally be considered a marker of a 
collaborative, as opposed to a confrontational, approach to international 
relations. However, China is currently confronted with a diplomatic crisis 
following repeated calls by the United States (US) Biden Administration, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General, 
and figures within the EU (the Commission President and parts of the 
European Parliament) for a league of countries including India, South 
Korea, Japan, and Australia to come together to uphold the values of 
liberal democracies against China. This is a clear indication that the world 
community is divided on ideological grounds of differing political values.
Additionally, the self-designated liberal democracies talk of holding China 
to a rules-based international order, a concept they have themselves 
introduced. This charge covers a wide range of issues including trade, human 
rights, finance, development, and (military) security. Given the ideological 
self-identification of Western countries (a classification which also includes 
East Asia and Australasia), a contextually useful description of Chinese 
multilateralism must offer insights into how it is shaped by its understanding 
of, and place in, a world society that sharply distinguishes itself from China.
This necessitates a meta-institutional theoretical review of how 
China approaches various aspects of world society. How does China 
understand the nature of the international legal order at a time when 
there are suggestions that it may be a revisionist power contesting that 
order? Due to China’s international stature, President Xi Jinping believes 
the nation is rightfully entitled to play a part in the future shaping of 
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this order. An explanation of what this means can be found in China’s 
understanding of the historical development of international law up 
to the present time, including an understanding of how complete, 
as well as how satisfactory, China considers this order to be.
Indeed, it is evident that China regards the international legal order to 
be a very incomplete and contested order. In this way, its multilateralism, 
far from being an attempt to overturn this order, is in fact one possible 
way to aim, collaboratively, towards the completion of this order. This 
is a primary context in which China’s multilateralism must be seen. It 
must also be made clear that China’s view of the incomplete nature 
of this legal order is widely shared in expert and authoritative Western 
circles in both international law and international relations.
1.2 Key issues and ideological differences
Within the controversies surrounding the nature of international law, there 
are at least two further issues which are central to providing an analytical 
framework within which to understand China’s approaches to multilateralism. 
The first concerns the relationship between the ideology of liberal democracy 
and the international order, of which international law is a part. The West 
believes this ideology should play a determining role in the substance of its 
relations with China, while China’s starting point is that classical international 
law does not have an explicitly ideological context: it is value-neutral.
The Chinese view of international law, with its primary stress upon state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, is to be seen in a historical perspective. 
It is tied to the adoption of the Western concept of the nation state, now 
understood as a defensive bulwark against foreign interference. However, 
at the same time, China (whether reactively or proactively) does in fact 
infuse its approach to multilateralism with a response to liberal democracy, 
reflecting on its identity as a developing state propounding socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. This may be characterised as a kind of neo-Marxism 
which sees China, along with most of the global South, as exploited by 
world capitalism and excluded from a fair share of global governance. The 
Chinese state therefore sees that the only way for a developing country to 
cope with the intrusive power of the West is to build a strong state apparatus 
which can control and direct economic and social forces. It may not have 
a definite strategy to export this model, but China will feel a natural affinity 
with countries with a similar institutional ethos. This is hugely important 
for issues of governance concerning the rule of law and human rights. 
This leads on to a more fundamental, civilisational aspect to understanding 
China’s approach to multilateralism. We enter the realm of comparative 
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political thought, contrasting liberal individualism and Confucianism through 
a historical perspective. This is probably the most important dimension if a 
Westerner is to understand the specifics of China’s multilateralist activities. 
It can only be speculative the extent to which either culture of thought in 
fact determines any state’s policies and actions. However, it is certain that 
the debate about international rules and order, of which multilateralism 
is a part, has itself become ideologised. Any analysis must therefore offer 
guidelines to navigate what might otherwise appear to be confusing 
arguments about the relative merits of contested ideas on either side. 
Essentially, a Confucian view of a rules-based order will not be the same 
as a liberal one. This is not to say that China is strictly a Confucian state or 
that the US is in turn a liberal state. But aspects of the critical discourse of 
these states and their institutional practices make more sense if interpreted 
through these paradigms. Broadly speaking, the liberal perspective 
sees rules as an outcome of deliberate negotiation and conclusion of 
contract or treaty between separated autonomous individuals. For a 
Confucian, rules are practices which evolve mutually through an evolving 
history of working relationships in particular contexts among a group of 
persons or partners who are all the time developing a common life-world 
which they all come to inhabit. This distinction does not represent an 
unbridgeable civilisational divide. It can be understood as a distinction 
between treaty or contract law and customary law. However, in the present 
context of international relations, when seen in historical perspective, the 
difference is arguably huge. It is within this difference that there comes 
the crucial source of contestation between China and the West: that 
the former is an authoritarian state while the latter are liberal states; 
the former ruled by personalities, the latter by law and not men. These 
dichotomies are rooted in cultural misunderstanding, if not ignorance.
1.3 Constructing the Chinese perspective
The starting point of the following analysis is the Chinese perspective. It 
intends to construct this perspective from leading texts and official speeches 
in an internal, intentionalist, phenomenological or hermeneutical sense, 
rather than extrapolate from external observation of Chinese institutional 
practice to see how far it corresponds to Western theories of international 
relations such as realism, constructivism, or neo-institutionalism.
Of course, it is not possible to directly access the day-to-day internal 
processes of decision-making by the top Chinese leadership, but it is 
possible to select certain texts that have authority on this matter due to the 
context in which they are published and the extensive quality of the analysis 
which they offer. These will be used here to illustrate the several distinctive 
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Chinese approaches already mentioned. The aim is to look critically at 
Chinese intentions by contextualising them as the products of historical 
experience. While some perspectives and practices may be becoming 
redundant in the modern world, we can also see that history may in some 
ways be repeating itself in Chinese–Western relations. The hermeneutical 
perspective allows the reader to understand the presuppositions (or 
anxieties) underlying certain policies, thereby opening possibilities to 
adjust them in new situations. By contrast, the external approach has built 
into it a tendency to take as a starting point the extent to which China is 
diverging from what the West considers to be appropriate standards.
More needs to be said about the ontology of intentionality. It is usually 
not possible to know the exact intentions of individuals. But a contextual 
understanding of the increasingly hostile perceptions of Chinese intentions 
in the West is possible and is offered here. We have distinguished the 
internal perspective from the external and shown how the latter is primarily 
employed by Western scholars and is almost inevitably hostile towards 
China because it requires China to meet indicators that the West has itself 
devised (Carty 2019; Wendt 1999). This report will give space to outlining the 
intentions of the Chinese, then critically assessing typical Western external 
assessment of Chinese behaviour in the light of Western-chosen indictors. It 
is intended here to contribute a social theory which offers an intentionalist 
analysis of precisely this Western external assessment. In other words, this 
report treats or reduces the Western external assessments of Chinese 
intentions to being themselves expressions of Western ‘intentionalities’.
The West is explicit about regarding China as a competitor and a rival. At 
the recent G7 Conference in June 2021, the US National Security Adviser 
categorically stated that the West had to offer an alternative global 
infrastructure to the Chinese BRI (Wintour 2021), while the EU Commission has 
already referred to China as a rival and competitor (European Commission 
2019). Theories of rivalry developed by Girard and Mishra (Carty 2021) stress 
that a fundamental feature of the social psychology of interaction among 
nations, as among individuals, is that they seek to overcome the void in their 
own societies by seizing, through imitation, what their rivals seem to have. 
This is precisely what we see in the new global infrastructure plan of the US.
An essential aspect of this rivalry is scapegoating the rival by denigrating 
their motives and intentions in seeking influence abroad. For example, 
the Western slur that China is a new imperial hegemon stands in stark 
contrast to the Chinese neo-Marxist self-image as a vanguard and 
progressive developing country. This negative interpretation is also 
projected onto the domestic affairs of China, which are automatically 
found to be wanting by virtue of the application of Western standards. 
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A crucial example is that China does not satisfy the ‘one man, one 
vote’ principle of liberal democracy. Here is where Chinese arguments 
for Confucian-style governance and a Confucian style of developing 
relationships nationally and internationally will be explained through an 
‘intentionalist’ method. External Western assessments of China’s intentions 
as self-serving for the nation’s elites will also be reviewed. Given the 
absence of a neutral third-party mediator, there cannot be a conclusive 
outcome to this analysis. It can, however, set out new perspectives 
and suggest how they can be helpfully employed in this context.
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2. Theoretical foundations of China’s 
approaches to multilateralism
This section offers an insight into Chinese thinking about rules, norms, 
law, and international law as it affects the formulation of Chinese 
approaches to multilateralism. It will also outline the continuing influence 
of Confucianism on Chinese public policy, indicating how this runs parallel 
to the role of law. These two issues are not completely separable. A third, 
related study observes how Chinese approaches to institutional practice 
are embedded in traditional Chinese family and social practices. These 
provide three frames within which to identify possible factors that are 
likely to shape decisions. They have a different kind of authority from the 
external observation found in Western journals because they carry detailed 
and classical interpretations of Chinese people and society in general. 
It must be said that the official Chinese Communist Party position is that 
rule of law and rule of man – in the sense of a virtuous man (Confucian) 
– must go together in the Chinese approach to governance. This leads 
to quite a complex picture. One theoretical view emphasises that there 
are no universal values and that it is not the official Chinese view to 
impose Confucianism as a universal system. At the same time, it is a 
deeply ingrained Chinese conviction that law without ‘the virtuous man’ 
is powerless to defend itself against human manipulation. Insistence upon 
this very traditional Confucian reservation about the value of law does not 
mean the Chinese state wishes to impose this model on other countries, 
but anxiety does exist among Western scholars that the language of 
Confucianism is an instrument of a Chinese attempt at hegemony (Xu 2013). 
The Chinese scholar Yu Keping places the official position from the National 
Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party in the following framework:
a) ‘Rule of law and rule of virtue coexist. In the process of governing 
the country according to law, running the country by virtue governance 
is also important. These are different from the West. That is, the 
Confucian approach not only rests on the impersonal observance 
of abstract legal rules, but also the security of the good moral 
character, trust, and beneficence of the participants’ (Yu 2021). 
b) ‘There are two basic factors that affect the governance level and 
efficiency of the state, that is, the quality of the governors and the 
system of governance. But, comparatively speaking, the system is 
more fundamental, because the system can transform the quality of 
people, restrict the abuse of power and dereliction of duty‘ (Yu 2018).
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c) ‘As the cooperative management of public affairs between the 
government and citizens, good governance needs the joint efforts of 
the government and citizens; moreover, with the development of society 
and the progress of politics, the role of citizens in the management 
of public affairs will become increasingly important’ (ibid.).
2.1 The rule of law vs the rule of man
Looking at the characteristics of China’s governance model the rule of 
law and the rule of man both play important roles at the same time. For 
the maintenance of social public order, moral norms and legal norms are 
complementary and indispensable to regulate human behaviour. After 
the reform and opening up, China has paid more and more attention to 
the rule of law. In the 1990s, it formally put forward the goal of building a 
socialist country under the rule of law and has since made great progress 
in its construction. However, as a country with more than 2,000 years of 
tradition of rule of man, this will understandably be a long process.
The rule of man will still play an important role. In many public 
governance activities, the role of the rule of man will even continue to 
be more important than the rule of law. This is also why there is a unique 
phenomenon of ‘top leaders’ (The Politburo Standing Committee) in 
Chinese politics, which is particularly important to the nation’s political 
life. On one hand, if China wants to truly move towards democratic 
governance, it must unswervingly carry out the rule of law. On the other 
hand, in order to achieve effective public governance in real life, the 
important role played by the rule of man must be acknowledged.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee decided to 
comprehensively promote the rule of law across seven major issues, 
clearly stating that China should ‘proceed from [its] reality’ and ‘adhere 
to the combination of rule of law and rule of virtue’ (Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China 2014, cited in Yu 2018). This was reiterated 
once again five years later: ‘we should adhere to the combination of 
rule of law and rule of virtue’ (Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China 2019, cited in Yu 2019, 2021). In this way, getting the 
balance right in the relationship between the stated rule of law and 
rule of virtue (or virtuous man) is vital for China’s public governance.
Within this official context we will juxtapose the distinct approaches of 
the international lawyer Zhipeng He and the Confucian philosopher Bai 
Tongdong. The former tends to treat Confucianism as a Chinese traditional 
culture which does not enjoy universal adherence and therefore is not an 
authoritative standard for resolving international conflict (any more than 
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the Western pretensions to represent liberal democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights as such). In this view, both are ideological tools used 
to assert national interests. By contrast, Bai Tongdong, a professional 
philosopher trained in the Western hermeneutic tradition by the American 
philosopher Stanley Rosen, presents Confucianism not as an aspect of 
Chinese culture or official ideology, but as a universally valid philosophical 
system that can be used to challenge Western political philosophy.
The concept of a parallel, mutually supporting role of rule of law and 
rule of the virtuous man, alongside and complementing the role of 
government and governance, will be seen later to play a major role in 
Chinese official and academic/intellectual self-understanding in the 
context of the further dichotomy of state and civil society. Contrary to 
general Western perceptions, the Chinese do believe they make such a 
distinction and that this is essential for understanding how the harmony 
of a successful social polity is achieved. This plays a large role in how 
the Chinese understand human rights law and its implications for global 
regulation of cybersecurity, peacekeeping (including development-
based peace), and development assistance provided to developing 
countries. All of this is relevant to the Western anxiety about an unrestrained 
authoritarian state unprepared to submit to the rule of law and human 
rights, especially freedom of speech and of political activity. 
2.2 China’s perspective on the international 
legal order
The Chinese Foreign Ministry commissioned an academic study of China’s 
approach to international law (originally published in Chinese in 2016 and 
translated into English in 2019): A Chinese Theory of International Law, by 
Zhipeng He and Lu Sun. The book was written not as an apology to the 
West of Chinese international law literature, but as an internal critique of 
the deficiencies of Chinese scholarship on the topic and an attempt to 
provide guidelines as to how it could be improved. A large part of the work 
comprises exhaustive reviews of Chinese language literature which are 
critically assessed.
He and Sun, pointing to the dynamics of an international order comprised 
of nation states, say that China will of course defend its national interest in 
multilateral relations because that is what all nation states do. There is no 
overarching international common good – other than that which is worked 
out in the dialectic of conflicting interest and negotiation. What is most 
clearly called for is that each actor forms a clear, mature concept of its 
own interests before entering negotiations (He and Sun 2019). In the case of 
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China, it is almost certainly possible to make a substantial list of advantages 
that China stands to gain from its development finance strategies, for 
instance. Writing for a national audience, their study expresses a concern 
that China may not, in the general field of law and international relations, 
prepare itself adequately to know exactly what it is doing. Going further, 
they warn against the idea that any country, through its foreign policy, is 
implementing the highest ideals of its own classical political philosophers. 
While these are worthy traditions which may – and should – be aspired 
to, it is wise to recognise that no such traditions are shared globally. 
It will be seen that the Chinese concept of international law is fundamentally 
Western and makes no attempt to construct an alternative international 
law with Chinese characteristics. This is because it avoids attachment 
to ideas which its proponents could claim had universal significance 
apart from the value that individual states would try to attach to them. 
2.2.1 Conflicts of national interest 
As He and Sun say, there is no objective concept of natural justice, only 
conflicts of the national interests of states, and international law must 
develop dialectically from the positions of all nation states. The current 
international system is an anarchy in which there is no supranational 
authority (He and Sun 2019: 9). Hence there is need for a mutual 
understanding between different regional systems of knowledge as well 
as between national cultures (ibid.: 10). Here is a clear indication in favour 
of a multilateralism which necessarily reflects regional clusters of states. 
Universal impartiality can only be based upon the balance of claims 
from different regions, and international law is always a manifestation of 
the wills of only some states and not all of them. There comes a warning, 
which runs through the whole study, that this approach places a huge 
obligation on each state to have a very clear concept of its own position 
if it is to contribute to the development of rules that reflect true fairness.
At the same time, rules can never simply be purely the result of national 
interest. The absence of coercive supranational authority means that 
processes of interactions, negotiation and compromise lead to rules which 
are, in effect ‘gentlemen’s agreements’, in the sense that they lack any 
external coercion (ibid.: 11–13). Here again there is a difference in emphasis 
to the Western perspective. While the legal character of agreements is not 
denied, there is a recognition that, in practical terms, they rest on continuing 
consent. As will be seen, this feature is reflected in the structure of both 
bilateral and regional agreements made by China, where reliance upon the 
independent supposed force of the international legal order is often explicitly 
excluded (such as in the BRI’s Memorandums of Understanding – MoUs). 
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2.2.2 The historical perspective
The authors He and Sun rely on the French postmodern thinker François 
Lyotard for their claim that international law has a deeply regional 
character and cultural heritage which affects the definition and 
understanding of its basic concepts, such as territorial integrity and 
self-determination (He and Sun 2019: 16–18). This leads the authors to a 
redefinition of national interests whereby they are not seen as in conflict, 
but in a dialectic: ‘International Law is the unity of opposites, between 
national interests and global interests... between cultural characteristics 
and universal ethics’ (ibid.: 19). Again, following Western legal culture, the 
authors align their perspective with the German historical school of law 
of Frederich von Savigny. That is to say, law arises out of the distinctive 
national experiences of peoples interacting with one another (ibid.: 39).
The authors’ view of the relationship between international law and 
international history is based on arguments with a deep underlying structural 
foundation (ibid.: 242). They say that countries’ rights and capabilities are, in 
a sense, ‘pre-born’ to them and are naturally recognised by the traditions 
within each country. That is to say, the national identity and experience of 
China, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and France, to name just a few, are 
grounded in their own endogenous experience and are not constituted 
for them by an overarching, all-powerful and transcendent international 
community. Beyond this pre-community reality, nation states are then simply 
sustained by customs of the international community, i.e. the interactions 
of nation states with one another. Western international lawyers, however, 
have lost sight of this fact and treat the origin of states no longer as a 
historical act, but imagine them as constituted by the international order. 
In this, the authors correctly align themselves with the American school 
of realism of Hans Morgenthau, who objects to how proponents of the 
precedence of the international legal order, such as Hans Kelsen, produce 
no empirical, historical evidence of how this – for him – fantastical order 
actually produces or otherwise creates nation states (Carty 2019: 1–28). 
2.2.3 Normative struggles 
Countries such as India and China face a dilemma, according to He 
and Sun. International law is a product of Western culture, but they 
have not developed a system of norms of their own. To simply adopt 
the Western system is to deny their own experience and paralyse their 
will. Yet it is impracticable to abandon the system entirely as it is widely 
regarded the standard of fairness and equity. The solution is to accept 
it critically while working for cultural balance (He and Sun 2019: 58–59). 
In the authors’ view it is national culture which predetermines political 
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discourse (ibid.: 139). Given this context and China’s historical experience 
of the Western practice of international law, it is inevitable that China 
simply recognises the objective existence of international law, which it 
does not like and therefore does not subjectively internalise (ibid.: 95).
China’s history of Confucianism and Taoism (as will be seen later with Bai 
Tongdong) leads it to favour self-cultivation rather than law as the normative 
basis of society (ibid.: 107–8), but it is important to understand that the 
authors do not put forward these traditions as standards of international 
conduct, precisely because they share the Western ‘realist’ conviction 
of Hans Morgenthau in international relations, that ideal standards do 
not govern international society – rather it is the clash and resolution 
of economic and security interests (ibid.: 140–1, 147). They conclude this 
review on the pessimistic note that China distrusts international law, is 
unable to utilise it, and is unable to shape it effectively (ibid.: 142). They 
give many historical examples, beginning with the Opium Wars, the 
Treaties of Nanjing (1842) and Tienstin and Peking (1858–60), but also 
including the failure of the League of Nations over Manchuria and China’s 
long exclusion from the international community, such as from the 1951 
San Francisco Peace Conference and, for many years, from the UN.
The well-known doctrine of peaceful coexistence exists within this realist 
paradigm, of which the authors consider Morgenthau (interpreted also by 
Lyotard) to be the authoritative exponent. International law has a place 
within this paradigm, neither at the top nor the bottom. The value hierarchy 
for states is that security comes first, followed by the economy, then social 
development, then friendship and esteem. It is only at this fourth level that 
the rule of law is present to a significant degree, beyond which, at a fifth level, 
there is international constitutionalism. Peaceful coexistence and mutual 
respect must account for the primary importance of tolerance (ibid.: 152–55).
There follows a recommended pathway of legal diplomatic communication 
(ibid.: 160–245) which takes Zhou en Lai’s philosophy at Bandung (1955) 
as a model, i.e. seeking consensus while reserving differences. There is 
little advantage in arguing fine differences as academic points because 
international law does not have a macro-system or even a hierarchy of 
norms. Even basic concepts such as self-defence and humanitarianism 
are contested. A tactful search for possibilities of common ground should 
be pursued in a spirit of balance which avoids both idealism and nihilism. 
Western concepts of natural law and justice are not universally believed and 
shared, just as Confucianism and other value systems are not. International 
anarchy requires rules, but in this environment they are doomed to not 
function well. The dilemma is that the world needs constitutionalism but 
does not have it. It needs a compassionate humanity but cannot abandon 
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the nation state for a world civil society. Achieving the latter is not realistic 
as we have not yet transcended struggles of conflicting interest between 
countries. And states can instrumentalise legal standards, as seen for 
instance with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the West in Libya.
Turning the focus to where we are now, the task of ensuring the progress 
of international law must still continue through the multilateralism 
and the dialectic of compromise through the gradual recognition 
of the extent of differences, especially cultural ones. Global 
constitutionalism and the creation of a global civil society for which it 
aims is not to be despised, but it can be seen as a utopian goal. 
For its part, China has at times, such as during the Cultural Revolution, 
stressed a struggle to overthrow imperialism (ibid.: 180–4). Yet Zhou en 
Lai’s warning remains fundamental, namely, to deal calmly with the 
complexities of the outside world. Realism also means a calm observation 
of the complexity and ambiguity of norms and facts through a judicious 
and critical reflection on the various cognitive interpretative codes that 
exist globally (ibid.: 201–2). A realistic approach to international law has 
a spiritual dimension in its ability to avoid both over-romanticism and 
nihilism. He and Sun argue that the world needs the development of 
effective international institutions, but they do not exist (ibid.: 210).
The task of ensuring the progress of international law rests with 
the multilateralism of states, whereby they slowly compromise 
through the gradual recognition of the extent of differences. 
Global constitutionalism remains a utopian ideal.
The authors end on a note of caution about ideals, whether it is the 
dream of a world Kantian peace or the global benevolence and tao 
(way) of Confucius and Mencius. Neither have any specific method 
or procedure for implementation, which is why they can have only an 
inspirational role. Furthermore, we must never lose sight of the conflicts 
of interest for which they can be so easily instrumentalised. Precisely 
for this reason, multilateralism is an absolute priority for China. 
2.3 The place of a rules-based international 
order in imagining multilateralism
2.3.1 Critical Western reflections
Given the constant reiteration by the West that China must be called to 
account to observe the rules-based international order (most recently at 
the June 2021 G7 meeting in Cornwall), it is worth noting that authoritative 
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Western opinions from academia and thinktanks correspond very closely 
to the vision set out by He and Sun. Firstly, Chalmers identifies a crucial 
gap in the existing international order (2019), a view that is reinforced by 
Williams (2020). The UK’s integrated defence review of 2021 also chimes 
with these two analysts. Chalmers divides the international space into 
four sectors: the universal political order (e.g. the UN Charter, the Law of 
the Sea Convention of 1982, the Human Rights Covenants); the universal 
economic order (including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Bretton 
Woods System); the Liberal Democratic order (which is not universal); and, 
most importantly, a normative void where there is an absence of rules and 
instead a balance of powers. Williams complements this perspective in 
his description of International Law with Chinese Characteristics (2020). 
His general conclusion about international law is that in making criticisms 
of China, the West should not romanticise the clarity or the moral force 
of the law, or indeed its necessarily liberal nature. The language of 
international law is used to explain states’ actions and goals, encompassing 
within it a normal contestation of politics. Williams argues that the issue 
is not how to preserve a rules-based order, but how to reshape and 
reform various rules to account for complex challenges (ibid.: 10).
2.3.2 Traditions in dialogue 
The primary significance of the contribution of Bai Tongdong in Against 
Political Equality: The Confucian Case (2020) is to suggest a model of 
the way forward for relations between China and the West. He tries to 
understand the differences of approach through the conscious construction 
of a dialogue between the two traditions of Chinese Confucianism and 
Western liberal democracy, which should make each reflexively aware of 
the self and of the other.
Writing from the Philosophy Department of Fudan University after stays in 
New York University and Harvard University, Bai’s intellectual history goes 
back as far as doctoral studies with the American philosopher Stanley Rosen, 
author of Hermeneutics as Politics (1987). Bai concurs with the view of He 
and Sun that China should not aim to present itself without qualification as 
a Confucian State, insofar as he says that none of his own arguments for 
Confucianism necessarily have any application to contemporary China. At 
the same time, a fundamental distinction in the thought of Bai is that he 
rejects the primacy of historical heritage (and hence the Western historical 
school of law) precisely on the grounds that it is a historical and not a 
philosophical approach. Bai, unlike He and Sun, presents Confucianism 
not as a Chinese philosophy, but as a universal philosophy – one that 
addresses features of the human condition that arise everywhere. 
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He juxtaposes this philosophy with that of liberal democracy and says that 
it is the latter which is in certain respects defective at the present time. 
This philosophical argument for the universality of Confucianism will 
mean that its characteristic methods of social organisation will also 
appear unconsciously in the West because they are natural human 
responses to shared human experiences. The idea of liberal democracy 
may be reflected in certain rules, but it is above all a social glue which 
enables families of like-minded nations to evolve their relationships 
with one another. They develop distinctive patterns of privacy and 
transparency, making space for one another while remaining open 
towards one another (Bai 2020: 138–40, 245–55). Section 3, on human 
rights, will use case studies to explore Bai’s comparisons further.
Bai’s fundamental warning remains: nation states are inevitably 
antagonistic towards one another and they will only see the growth in 
another’s power in a negative light. Relentless competition between 
nation states, as long as political entities retain this self-understanding, 
will always generate serious instability in their relations. 
He and Sun have constructed a theory of international law which excludes 
an explicit role for Confucianism in the development of multilateralism, 
while at the same time recognising that the communist one-party state 
in China will always be a cause of distrust on the part of Western states. 
Indeed, China currently faces various attempts to build a coalition of like-
minded states which call themselves liberal democracies. The interest of 
the work of Bai Tongdong is that he addresses this opposing ideology 
proactively. Bai offers a challenge to liberal democracy, but also an equally 
serious challenge to what he takes to be the realist nationalism underlying 
the dominant Chinese approach to international relations (Bai 2020). In 
other words, Bai does not think that the conflict of national interests among 
states will be resolved through a dialectic of clashing perspectives leading 
to compromise or consensus. Nation states are deeply antagonistic, so a 
China which rises with this ideology is bound to cause concern. The great 
interest of this analysis is that, while it does not directly consider He and Sun, 
it does suggest a closeness between their ideas and the official Chinese 
position while allowing for debate about how to modify their thesis.
As will be seen later in Western reviews of the Chinese multilateralism, there 
is a great anxiety that one form of Chinese hegemony would be an attempt 
to spread Confucianism as part of the rejuvenation of China. This is because 
the traditional Tributary System, with its hub and spoke character, represents 
a hierarchical vision of world society with China at the centre. Formal equality 
of individuals is a basic tenet of liberal democracy, and this is reflected in 
international law. However, Bai is a philosopher who asserts that Confucian 
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classical texts are a starting point for contemporary, universal philosophical 
reflections, including also reference to historical examples of China’s Spring 
and Autumn/Warring States period from approximately 770 BCE to 221 BCE.
The explicit assumption that Bai shares with He and Sun is that China is 
not a Confucian state. The hostility of Chinese nationalist modernisers 
towards Confucianism since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 has, in his 
view, left the majority Chinese ethnic group, the Han, as a people without a 
culture. To address this, he calls for a cultural project rooted in education. 
In his critique of nationalist realism, Bai states that the central pathway to 
modernity chosen by China is ethnic nationalism, but at a time when the 
ideology of liberal democracy considers this to be inherently conflictual and 
doomed to struggles for hegemony. Therefore, he thinks hostile Western 
perceptions of China are inevitable. His ideas on international order form an 
integral part of the entire book, but they are specifically set out in chapter 7 
(pp. 175–213). Bai’s entire philosophical project is undertaken in dialogue with 
liberal democracy, and he holds out the promise of a reconciliation with it.
2.4 Constructing a Chinese philosophical 
foundation for international relations 
There are three crucial elements of Bai’s argument that pave the way 
for his foundation for multilateralism. The first step is the argument that 
modern Western nationalism has been built on race, and this inheritance 
by blood has proved divisive and conflictual in Western history as well 
as in China where this ideology led to assimilationist strategies in Tibet 
and Xinjiang. These provinces were conquered by the Qing Dynasty, itself 
a minority ethnic group, with no interest in assimilating the provinces 
to the Han people. Official pressure on the Chinese government to 
recognise different ethnic groups merely accentuates division.
The second step is to argue that the Western solution to the nationalist 
dilemma is equally unsound. It conceives of the world without national 
identities, resting instead on a concept of universal human rights held 
by individuals in states indistinguishable from one another. Human 
rights occupy the central space and individual states may – at most – 
develop a notion of civic identity through their country’s constitution. 
Bai argues that this harks back to the ethos of the Roman Empire 
which collapsed suddenly when the centre, Rome itself, fell.
The third step is to argue for a form of cultural and historical identity 
that would enable a society of people to enjoy a sense of cohesion. 
He thinks that a compromise has to be found between the extremism 
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of a racist nationalism, which is completely impenetrable, and a 
universalist human rights ideology, which he provocatively equates 
with the extreme altruism of the Chinese cultural revolution. Fei’s 
comparison of Confucian Chinese and Western approaches to the 
creation of institutions will make it possible to explore in greater detail 
the contrast in this human rights ideology. First, it is necessary to consider 
what he would see as Confucian foundations for multilateralism. 
Crucially, Western discourse ties multilateralism to partnerships of 
liberal democracies. Chinese multilateralism will, therefore, inevitably 
be shaped by having to respond to this understanding of international 
cooperation. Bai’s premise for constructing a Confucianist theory 
of international relations is that it is a philosophical approach, not 
a historical or anthropological one – and therefore not a culturalist 
characteristic of China – that could lead to an international order with 
Chinese characteristics. That is, there are universal problems to which 
universal solutions are offered, and Confucianism is one such offer to be 
judged by the quality of its answers to these problems (Bai 2020). With 
this thinking, Bai hopes to win over the partially undecided states beyond 
the narrower circle of North America, Western Europe, and Australasia.
Bai’s critique of liberal democracy equates Confucianism with the need for 
a meritocracy in large, modernised states with disparate populations and 
where state administration is too complex for a ‘one man, one vote’ system of 
electing political leaders to work effectively. A meritocracy, by contrast, is a 
professional class of state administrators or managers trained and selected 
on the basis of proven competence to govern the modern state as a life-long 
task. While Bai draws on Confucius and Mencius for his arguments, adopting 
a universalist stance, he draws equally on Plato (The Republic), Montesquieu, 
and even John Rawls to make the argument that even professional classes 
of workers such as lawyers, engineers, and doctors, do not have the general 
expertise and leisure time necessary to understand and participate 
in political decision-making, not to mention lower working classes.
2.4.1 Democracy vs meritocracy
Democratic voting is one of the key elements of liberal democracy. It 
is based on universal suffrage, or ‘one man, one vote’ and has its roots 
in the natural law idea that all men are born equal and have equal 
innate rights, not rights accorded to them by society. The Confucian 
method is a meritocracy, in which people only become entitled to 
participate politically through an education that is both knowledge-
based and moral. The capacity to make political decisions is gained 
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through an apprenticeship in actual decision-making which takes 
years before reaching the higher levels of central government. 
The supposed innate political equality of individuals means that they 
tend to follow their short-term selfish interest in voting. Additionally, the 
public are generally ignorant of the issues. An outcome of this is that the 
electorate is open to demagoguery and corruption. Bai draws on Rawls 
and Montesquieu for the argument that large democracies are prey to 
oligarchical pressure, which further increases their dysfunctionality (Bai 2020).
The liberal wing of liberal democracy offers some hope of compromise 
or common ground. It encompasses the rule of law, which is effectively 
government by unelected judges whose authority rests upon moral probity 
and a wisdom-based experience. Equally, financial management, for 
example the US Federal Reserve and the management of diplomacy 
through a foreign service selected through competitive examination, 
means that in practice considerable areas of Western governance do 
follow a kind of meritocracy. Bai shows that the US historically had a 
constitutional system that involved a great deal of indirect election. 
Experienced state politicians would advance to the federal level, 
and indeed, the president himself was indirectly elected by Congress. 
However, the liberal approach to democracy assumes a mass suspicion 
of elites which is now – especially with the latest waves of populism – 
even more difficult to resist in favour of arguments for meritocracy. 
Bai’s arguments do not require him to commit himself to a single model of 
hybrid government. The great relevance of his thinking is to detoxify the 
authoritarian image of Confucianism and, with it (although he separates 
the two), claim that China is not a Confucian state. Also important is 
that the Chinese model, whose worst feature in the eyes of the West is 
its supposed authoritarianism, sees itself instead as a meritocracy.
A model of government that he does mention is the quota system of 
the functional constituencies in Hong Kong, where all the professional 
groups select a few representatives to devote themselves mainly to 
government. Another quota system can be seen in the German Federal 
Council, which consists of delegates from all the federal states whose 
composition is always changing through staggered elections, thereby 
ensuring that every shade of opinion is taken into account in government.
Bai accepts that the ultimate legitimacy of government is the conviction 
of the people that the government is serving their interests. In this way, 
there should be a place for a popular assembly chosen by democratic 
vote where these concerns can be voiced, but it should never be allowed 
to have the final say. This is very much in line with the classical Confucian 
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view that while the ruler is there to serve the people, there is no procedure 
whereby the people could overthrow the ruler. At the same time, historically, 
rulers who were tyrants were usually deposed one way or another and this 
was taken, retrospectively, as an indication that ‘heaven’ had withdrawn 
its approval of, and hence the legitimacy of, the ruler (Bai 2020).
2.4.2 Confucian compassion 
The key quality of the meritocratic ruler, for the Confucian philosopher 
Bai, is the capacity for compassion. A large part of the argument against 
‘one man, one vote’ is that it cannot assure the necessary comprehensive 
representation of interests, including future generations, minority groups 
within states, and (crucially for this study) the welfare of other states. The 
foundation of democracy as an innate natural right places no restraint 
upon the discretion of the individual voter to decide in their own short-term 
personal interest, including no duty to act reasonably even with limited 
choices. The concept of compassion covers the imaginative capacity 
to consider all of these interests, especially the longer-term view.
Bai tries to avoid metaphysical speculation about the nature of the 
‘common good’, which is the object of compassion, but it is part of his 
argument that Western public space is now radically fragmented, not only 
by the selfishness of materialist individualism, but also by sectarian world 
views within Western societies that concern gender, race, and religious 
views. Populism is also driven by extreme economic inequality and growing 
pressure from the oligarchy in the media influencing public opinion. Western 
perspectives about governance cannot be expected to change. Instead, 
these ideas about meritocracy are aimed towards Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, who are the primary targets of Chinese multilateralism. 
Compassion is given considerable space in Bai’s work as it provides 
the political philosophy that could underly a Chinese approach to 
multilateralism. He treats compassion both as the social glue which holds 
large societies of strangers together and, more originally, as the bond 
for inter-state relations (Bai 2020: 110). Compassion is the imaginative 
capacity to grasp the significance of the welfare and happiness of others 
and (following Mencius in particular) is the primary marker of humaneness.
The classic example is of a stranger rescuing a drowning child from a 
pond. The bond of compassion arises in this case completely without self-
interest and the absence of this quality is the very mark of inhumanity. 
Compassion overcomes the defects of representative democracy because 
this larger spirit does not crave popular approval and – crucially – has an 
emotional range that encompasses strangers, including those beyond the 
boundary of one’s own state. It even encompasses the whole of humanity. 
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There are at least two crucial features of the virtue of compassion 
which render it distinctive from the usual catalogue of Western values. 
Because compassion is not innate, in the sense that one is not born 
with it automatically but it is learned in the family, the distinction 
between private and public, as upheld by the West, is lost.
Confucian thinking about benevolence maintains that it has to be 
nurtured and learned by education and habit in the basic forum of 
the family. The crucial imaginative step is to extend this relationship of 
compassion into a wider vision of family. Confucius famously describes 
how benevolence extends from the son to the father, from the family 
to the neighbourhood and society, and from the society to the whole 
world. It is Mencius who gives this idea a specific international relations 
dimension because he develops the concept of the benevolent ruler, 
whose imagination extends to the welfare of all neighbouring states.
Bai explains that the concept of benevolence is universal in the philosophical 
sense, as a response to the dilemma of government when it comes to 
large political bodies and their relations with one another. It comes from 
a Chinese thinker and is distinctly Chinese only in the sense that the 
classical Western virtues set out in Plato’s The Republic do not contain this 
element. Instead, Western normativity is constructed through the free will of 
innately independent and equal individuals, with all obligation traceable 
back to contract. This will be seen more later in a discussion of Fei.
2.4.3 Bridging the private and public spheres
Benevolence as a foundation for political relations turns the Western 
distinction between private and public virtue upside down, which in turn has 
crucial implications for the purpose of law (whether constitutional law or 
human rights law). Western thinking assumes that there is an unbridgeable 
chasm between the private and the public. In this way, the function of law 
is to protect one from the other. First, it has to protect the public from the 
private because the intrusion of self-interest into the public domain will 
distort the public good. Second, the intrusion of the public into the private 
is a suffocating force to the individual. Yet, starting from the concept of the 
family (a universal phenomenon), Bai insists that the capacity to transcend 
self-interest is learned through relationships in the family. Only then does it 
extend to wider society and the world. Without this grounding in the family, 
nothing will follow. This is not a view that is widely held in the West today: 
values are learned through liberal education in schools. The Republic goes 
as far as to talk of abolishing the family. While Aristotle is not so extreme, 
believing virtue must be learned and that family rests on the partnership of 
man and woman, compassion still does not feature in his litany of virtues.
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There is a fundamental feature of Confucianism which has parallels in 
The Republic and is directly relevant to the Western anxiety of what 
it calls Chinese authoritarianism. As previously mentioned, Bai resists 
universal suffrage in favour of a mixed regime of meritocracy and popular 
representation. The most crucial element of the toolbox of the meritocratic 
ruler is compassion. This is not a virtue that one can expect the masses 
to possess. The capacity to take the long view – the intergenerational 
view and the international view – is only possible by an aristocracy of 
rulers, called the benevolent rulers. The Republic has a similar concept 
of ‘guardians’, whose authority is constructed through Socrates’ famous 
lie that they are somehow born out of the soil of the homeland. They are 
taken completely out of the realm of the private sphere and must have 
no family connections and own no property, being sustained entirely 
from public funds as they operate solely for the welfare of the public.
A definition of public welfare is not found anywhere in The Republic, Bai 
notes. The Confucian concept of the public good goes beyond that of the 
Western because it asserts that an individual’s wellbeing includes not merely 
the material but also the moral or spiritual. This cannot be provided through 
legal regulation, but through moral education. As there is no clear dividing 
line between the public and the private spheres, this may appear arbitrary. 
However, public direction is not guided by coercive laws and sanctions, 
but through the influence of habit and practice in the fulfilment of roles in 
the society, as well as in the development of relations at the international 
level. These habits and practices undergo continual adjustment through 
interactive feedback. These assumptions shape the Chinese institutional 
practice of multilateralism, which is not focused primarily on rule observance 
as much as on frameworks for continuous cooperation and consultation. 
This approach to governance is quite different from the liberal rule of law, 
the latter being based upon ostensibly precisely agreed standards, and 
its legitimacy determined only through consent of the parties. Bai claims 
there is an inflexibility in the rule of law which lies in the fundamentalist 
individualism which argues that individuals are innately free and equal and 
come to association without moral characteristics, apart from free will. The 
Confucian approach, based upon the experience of familial compassion 
extended into wider society, is by contrast a pragmatic system of trial and 
error. This offers more flexibility than a rigid liberalism that does not allow 
for negotiation. The argument about whether an agreed rules-based 
order becomes rather a fetish of the idea of such an order, which has not 
in fact been agreed in any detail, remains to be seen. However, the West 
is aware that a Chinese approach, so far as it is Confucian, would be in a 
different spirit. It would state very broad aims of friendship and constructive 
cooperation, laying the stress upon frameworks for continuing collaboration 
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and building relationships based upon mutual understanding – a typical 
diplomatic concept stemming from the core virtue of compassion.
2.4.4 Reflections on world government
Like He and Sun, Bai remains sceptical of world government. They believe 
that a population will always look first to its own national government 
for protection and welfare. Bai’s doctrine of compassion argues that the 
strongest compassion exists within the family. As it extends to wider society 
and internationally, it becomes weaker to the point that, at the international 
level, it is always the duty of the state to consider first the welfare of its own 
people. No precise demarcation rules exist for these gradations. In the view 
of Bai, the virtue of compassion is the only viable foundation for long-term 
international collaboration on matters of the common good, especially 
the environment. However, he sees that momentum for such collaboration 
will always be relatively weak compared to the domestic sphere.
Some famous Confucians are for global government, but Bai rejects this idea. 
The goal of a harmonious world is to be achieved through the humane spirit 
of a large state humanely governed. Mencius believed that a single global 
state could only be coercively constructed. Instead, he favoured a principle 
of universal compassion, with open borders so that persons can move freely 
from tyrannical states to humanely governed states. This principle of universal 
governance is based on the idea that a leading humane state openly 
attracts strangers from abroad to migrate to its territory. It is this inward 
migration which is the foundation for its growing primacy (Bai 2020: 238–9).
Despite Bai’s philosophical stance towards Confucianism, we might recall 
He and Sun’s realistic assessment that the West will always feel some 
distrust about the existence of the communist party system in China. 
Beyond describing these ideas, it is still necessary for Western social 
theory of international law and governance to offer some framework 
for a practical coming together of perspectives. However, at this stage, 
the relevance of Bai depends upon showing that Confucianism is 
influential in China, both officially and academically/intellectually.
The discussion that follows will primarily focus on international governance 
but it will, where appropriate, make further mention of the questions around 
cybersecurity, the environment, the role of law, Confucian ethics, and – 
above all – the relationship between state and civil society in China. 
The contextualisation of contemporary Confucianism in China’s 
approach to international relations is reaffirmed by some Chinese 
scholars in their views about China’s role in international development.
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2.5 Confucianism in Chinese public policy 
The relevance of Bai depends upon showing that Confucianism is 
influential in China, both officially and academically. China not only 
pursues the prosperity of its own country and people, but it also 
consciously coordinates the relationship between national interests 
and the common interests of mankind. It integrates rationally into 
globalisation, participates in international mechanisms, undertakes 
the responsibility of a responsible power in international affairs, and 
creates an environment conducive to the common prosperity and 
progress of mankind (Gu 2015; Gu and Kitano 2018; Cai 2005).
2.5.1 The community of human destiny
The ‘community of human destiny’ is a concept on the development of 
human society advocated by the Chinese government in recent years, 
and it is a significant guiding influence in China’s foreign policy. In 2011, the 
White Paper China’s Peaceful Development proposed for the first time to 
seek new meanings of common human interests and values from the new 
perspective of a ‘community of common destiny’ (SCIO 2011). In 2012, the 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China formally put forward 
that, in recognition that there is only one earth for mankind to inhabit, this 
idea of the ‘community of human destiny’ should be promoted (Cai 2017a: 34).
Win-win cooperation means advocating a sense of a community 
of common destiny for mankind, taking into account the 
reasonable concerns of other countries in the pursuit of their own 
interests, promoting the common development of all countries 
in the pursuit of their own development, establishing a new 
type of global development partnership that is more equal and 
balanced, helping each other in the same boat, sharing rights and 
responsibilities, and promoting the common interests of mankind.
The interests of all countries blend, rise and fall together, and peace and 
danger coexist, forming a community of shared destiny. In the face of 
the complex and changeable international situation and severe and 
prominent global problems, people of all countries need to strengthen 
friendly exchanges, join hands and help each other in the same boat. 
(Xi 2014, in Cai 2017b)
Contemporary China is an active participant in and a key beneficiary of 
globalisation, and firmly pursues the policy of economically opening up to 
the outside world, advocating freedom of trade, foreign investment, and 
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the global governance strategy of joint discussion, joint construction, and 
sharing. These strategies and policies undoubtedly have the colour and 
value orientation of liberalism. In particular, the emphasis on the community 
of human destiny highlights a difference to nationalism (Cai 2017b: 20).
2.5.2 China’s participation in global governance 
From the perspective of relations between China and the world, 
contemporary China, having developed and advanced under reform 
andopening up, now stands as one of the world’s leading economies. 
As China’s standing in foreign and international affairs increases, so the 
international community expects more of it in terms of responsibility. 
As a result, actively participating in global governance is of particular 
importance for contemporary China. 
By actively participating in global governance, China indicates its 
identification with the current international system and international order, 
helping to mitigate any doubts or misunderstandings the international 
community may harbour about China. Global governance, as a project 
of contemporary human society, is conducted under the framework of the 
existing international system. Active involvement recognises the legitimacy 
and authority of the UN and international law and signals an identification 
with the existing international system and order. China therefore plays 
the role of a reformer and improver rather than a revolutionary or 
challenger in international affairs (Gu, Humphrey and Messner 2008). 
Second, China’s active participation in global governance demonstrates 
an assumption of responsibility, which in its very being defuses criticism 
from the international community of China’s insufficient involvement. 
Global governance relies on the active involvement of various actors, and 
especially those that provide more global public goods, defined as material 
goods (funds, tangible materials, etc.) and institutional and conceptual 
goods (international mechanisms, new ideas, value norms, etc.). The supply 
and management of global public goods is an important guarantee for 
the implementation of global governance, and an effective means of 
promoting it. China’s increased UN membership fees and enthusiastic 
participation in the Paris Climate Accord, the establishment of the SCO, 
the Boao Forum for Asia, the AIIB, funding for the BRI, and advocacy 
for a harmonious world and the community of human destiny all attest 
to China’s endeavours to provide global public goods. However, while 
cautiously insisting on China’s position as the world’s largest developing 
country, we should also take a broader global view of the expanding 
impact and subsequent influence on the world of this huge economy. 
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Only by actively participating in the process of global governance 
and constantly advocating and practicing these ideas can China 
cast off the shackles of realism in contemporary international relations, 
diminish and eliminate conflicts and confrontations, and guide 
mankind towards harmonious coexistence and common prosperity.
Regardless of the international realities the country confronts or the ideas 
and values it should establish, actively participating in global governance 
is China’s strategic vision (Cai 2016a: 144–45). China is facing several new 
challenges in the process of participating in global governance. Many 
of these aspects are well-known but the most central is the advocacy 
of a community of human destiny, which is a unique contribution and 
commitment to the furtherance of global governance (ibid.: 323).
2.5.3 Soft power
Specifically on the question of whether China may have hegemonic aims 
through its soft power, Confucian or otherwise, Chen Zhimin makes the 
following interesting observations. There are many complementarities 
or overlaps in the soft power resources between China and the EU, but 
there are also some significant differences, especially the differences 
in the values conveyed by them. Due to high levels of economic and 
social development and deep integration, the core values of many 
European countries have Western characteristics, such as democracy 
and human rights, limited sovereignty, supranational governance, 
humanitarian intervention, environmental protection, and sustainable 
development. However, China has had complete national independence 
for only 60 years and is still a member of developing countries in terms 
of economic development (despite China’s leading role in world trade, it 
still has about 600 million people living in relative poverty). Its core values 
emphasise sovereignty and development. European countries safeguard 
territorial integrity and oppose external interference in a country’s affairs, 
insisting on international cooperation through consultation. China 
emphasises development as a priority, with environmental protections 
to first take into account the needs of economic development.
Chen also states that for China – in view of longstanding misgivings and 
misunderstandings of the international community, especially developed 
countries – soft power is more for defensive purposes. It intends to promote 
communication and understanding across borders, deepening exchanges 
between countries and reducing distrust of China’s development rather 
than actively promoting China’s values. So far, the Chinese government 
has never publicly acknowledged the existence of the Chinese model, 
let alone adopted relevant policies to export it (Chen 2011: 51–52).
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3. Human rights and the 
international order 
3.1 Introduction
Human rights have acquired a very generalised role in the context of Western 
states’ approach to China. They speak of democratic alliances to contain 
China as an authoritarian state, so as to preserve the liberal democratic 
international order. The key human right underlying this order is universal 
suffrage, with regular elections held in a multi-party state (Ginsburg 2020). 
Other rights include freedom of speech, personal freedom within the rule 
of law, and a market economy rather than state-directed mercantilist 
economy (the main focus of the US-directed trade war against China).
With the crises over democracy in Hong Kong and anxiety over the national 
security implications of Huawei’s advantages in 5G communications 
technology, the issue of human rights has become an integral part of 
geopolitical debates involving China. It is no longer simply a matter 
of state interaction in the UN Human Rights Council. As mentioned 
earlier, the whole idea of multilateralism becomes problematic if 
participating states begin to divide themselves into groups, such as by 
expressing a desire to collaborate with like-minded states to contain 
others which do not share their values, i.e. authoritarian states. 
The area of human rights has become contested within the wider 
context of the international order as a whole. In relation to this wider 
discussion of multilateralism, two suggestions will be made. 
First, given that human rights issues, from China’s perspective, are likely 
to spill over into core issues of international trade (e.g. the European 
Parliament calling for non-signature of the CIA and the danger of a 
Western boycott of Huawei), it is interesting to explore and highlight the 
challenges that Bai presents to Western-style democracy, particularly for 
the still-developing third world. This goes beyond maintaining the stance 
that China has held until now: that human rights are a matter of domestic 
jurisdiction. This may not be enough if Western countries are serious 
about linking trade with human rights. While China is already building a 
coalition of developing countries to support it at the UN, this may not be 
enough for it to confront the comprehensive breakdown of multilateralism 
which threatens. It is necessary, as Bai recommends, to demonstrate to 
the West the shortcomings of its own concepts of human rights-based 
governance. What the present practice of Chinese multilateralism in 
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human rights appears to show is more of a siege mentality, a defensive 
stance which does not systematically engage with a looming repeat of the 
nineteenth century move by the West to try to isolate and control China.
Second, the West needs to appreciate that the rules-based order of the 
liberal, democratic, market economy that it is calling for is not, and never 
has been, a universal system of international order. If the West is going to 
persist in demanding that this system must be accepted by Russia and 
China, the West would be, in this case, the revisionist power. The focus of 
this study is Chinese approaches to multilateralism, not those of the West, 
but it is obvious that Chinese approaches cannot function in isolation. If the 
restoration of multilateralism in the West under President Biden will mean 
a reinvigoration of NATO and involve a partnership of countries across 
the Atlantic to contain authoritarian states, then such strategies are not 
globalist. Both sides must recognise that the world order is not complete, 
and that there is still work to be done to shape this order. As indicated earlier, 
studies are already emerging which help to indicate what this work entails.
In this context, we will now undertake a closer analysis of critiques of Chinese 
conceptual approaches to human rights to uncover exactly what is at 
issue in human rights controversies. Then, the issue of Chinese objections to 
interference in domestic affairs on the pretexts of human rights offences will 
be explored both in the general context of international law on intervention 
and in terms of differences in understanding between China and the 
West with respect to freedom of expression, intellectual discourse, and 
the nature of public political debate. This will be followed by a case study 
on global regulation of cyberspace. The analysis will then conclude with 
a commentary on Western criticisms of Chinese human rights diplomacy 
at the UN and China’s approach to UN peacekeeping. The topic of 
development finance and assistance will be left to the next and final section.
3.1.1 The Chinese experience 
Reflecting once more on a major criticism of the work of He and Sun, directed 
to themselves and their Chinese international law colleagues, is that they 
are not able to reconstruct international law thinking in a way that expresses 
their own culture and history. This is an intellectual task which they are not 
yet either equipped for, or willing to undertake. Bai, however, is more directly 
challenging of his American political theory colleagues, as they are with 
him. He argues that the Chinese approach to human rights is based upon 
the classical (pre-1945) Western view that human or civil rights are a matter 
of domestic constitutional law, where each country develops its own view 
of these rights. As He and Sun make clear, the notion of the nation state 
upon which human rights build is constructed around the German historical 
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school of law, in particular Fredrick von Savigny. The governing idea is that 
each nation has its own constitution which reflects its own traditions.
There is now increasing concern that China is in fact gaining widespread 
diplomatic recognition for its approach to human rights, but it is not 
appreciated that there is nothing particularly Chinese about this 
approach. The point of national independence is to guarantee this. It is 
only Bai who deepens the debate and gives the Chinese experience a 
potentially universal import, though not yet from a legal perspective.
3.1.2 External observations
In a systematic and comprehensive study published in 2012, German 
political scientist Katrin Kinzelbach examines all of China’s statements 
and initiatives in the UN human rights fora. What emerges is a consistent 
pattern stretching from the early 1990s to the present day. Her critique of 
China resembles that of He and Sun, in terms of a Chinese dissatisfaction 
with contemporary international law thinking that, as yet, does not have 
the capacity to reformulate it in preferred terms. Her fundamental points 
are that China does not contest any of the existing catalogue of human 
rights, including a right to democracy, but insists it must be entirely within 
the judgment of each state how it develops and protects the uncontested 
rights of its people. China always challenges the implementation of rights, 
and not the normative order as such (Kinzelbach 2012: 331). She sees that 
China is not opposed to international standards, but compliance is a matter 
of interpretation and not facts (ibid.: 309). So, it is not surprising that Beijing 
insists that no entity independent of the Chinese state, whether domestic 
or international, should interfere with the exercise of its judgment about its 
national circumstances. The idea that there is no one model of development 
is the very essence of nationalism, in her view, as nationalists always claim 
they are unique and no one universal rule can apply to them (ibid.: 308–9).
However, as a German and European scholar, Kinzelbach does not appear 
to be fully aware of her own history or to understand any longer the classical 
international law to which China is continuing to adhere. She contends that 
China considers sovereignty to be more important than human rights, citing 
Deng Zhou Ping who said that the rights of the nation are more important 
than human rights. She is astonished that China talks of the fundamental 
rights of states when for Europeans, this language belongs to individual 
persons. This is to treat the state as absolute (ibid.: 320). She forgets that 
such language was normal Western international law vocabulary at least 
until the 1950s (Carty 2019). She also does not appreciate how easily China 
can win coalitions with other countries based on the conviction that 
enforcing human rights is a pretext to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
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other countries. In forgetting the European colonial history, she is bemused 
by the Chinese view that the right to self-determination is the basis for 
all human rights, making the violation of sovereignty a human rights 
violation. So, China says that to interfere in another country in the name of 
protecting human rights is a betrayal of the human rights cause (ibid.: 322). 
Kinzelbach detects an unwillingness from the Chinese to discount the 
significance of human rights but also sees that the country is unable to 
prioritise them. She reiterates that economic, social, and cultural rights 
come first, but political rights complement the others. An orderly increase 
in political participation is, therefore, also an important goal (ibid.: 324–5). 
She recognises that China does not say that any rights are intrinsically 
more important than others (ibid.: 329). Her impression is that China is 
unable to fundamentally challenge the normative order established by 
human rights law, which is why it instead challenges implementation. 
So, in her view, why would that change in the future (ibid.: 131)? 
It is doubtful whether Kinzelbach or her fellow Europeans are any more 
able than the Chinese to reflect critically on the nature of this inherited 
order. Kinzelbach notes with concern that China has tried to call on the 
Human Rights Council to promote the inclusiveness of different cultural 
traditions, a move which she calls out as a ‘particularist’ approach, 
presumably failing to see that human rights are inherently a globalist, 
cosmopolitan ideology. She is especially alarmed about the Chinese 
promotion of the idea of social responsibility and harmony because this 
challenges what she calls the very essence of human rights norms.
Kinzelbach notes that the EU response to human rights made them 
conditional on the performance of human duties and responsibilities – 
which was against the core principles of human rights. Kinzelbach says 
that China is questioning the central concept of unconditional entitlement 
(ibid.: 309–11). She continues: ‘that human rights protection was subject 
to an individual’s social conduct defies the very essence of human rights’ 
(ibid.: 300). She recognises that this implies an entirely different idea of 
the relationship between individual, society, and state. She concludes by 
formulating the issue as necessarily confrontational. Beijing will not accept 
the idea that individuals hold unconditional entitlements against the state 
(ibid.: 329). This is without saying what unconditional means and with respect 
to what. This is a civilisational difference between China and the West 
which Bai has clearly articulated. The Western idea is that human rights 
are innate, granted by God at birth, while the Chinese Confucian view is 
that the individual is only educated into full moral personhood in society, 
primarily through the family. It is also a fact that this Western conception is 
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not inherent to the whole Western tradition, as the role of social upbringing 
in constituting individual moral personality was recognised also by Aristotle.
3.2 Intervention
From a purely, albeit narrow, legal perspective, the above conflict about 
the very meaning of basic concepts of human rights is playing out as 
a normative battle around the notion that international law prohibits 
interference. This goes beyond intervention in the internal affairs of states on 
the ground that they are violating human rights. Therefore, it is necessary to 
revisit the whole understanding of the concepts of free speech and freedom 
of information and of the media (including the internet) within the wider 
context of definitions of foreign intervention in the domestic politics of states. 
3.2.1 The legal framework
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and 
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty in 1965, passed 
unanimously, provides ‘no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly 
for any reason whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other State’ 
(UNGA 1965). A later UNGA declaration is even more explicit on this point: 
Armed intervention and all other forms of interference in the form of 
providing financial or other assistance or to incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the 
regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State violate 
international law.  
(UNGA 1970)
Despite these categorical statements, great disagreements arise in 
practice concerning the meaning of intervention. Some idea of the 
reasons for this can be gathered from another UNGA resolution which 
did not receive universal consent: the 1981 Inadmissibility of Intervention 
and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, which went into 
further detail still. It is discussed by a private group of experts called 
the European Leadership Network who, in 2017, were trying to devise 
common standards for non-interference between Russia and the West. 
They notice that the provisions of the above resolution offer maximum 
clarity. It goes much further than calling for no threat or use of military 
or economic coercion, to require as well that States refrain from:
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a. any action or attempt to destabilize the political system
b. the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or 
indirect, of any action which seeks to disrupt the unity or 
undermine or subvert the political order of other States
c. any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda
d. the exploitation and the distortion of human rights issues as a means 
of interference.  
(Raynova 2017)
This European study recognises the practicality of these formulations 
but says that they largely boil down to descriptions of events, 
actions, and expressions of opinions where there will be no agreed 
standards of objectivity between Russia and the West.
The four standards enumerated have not been recognised universally 
as binding in general international customary law. The Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of International Law entry on intervention (Kunig 2008) was 
more categorical. Kunig says this resolution is not helpful and its broad 
definition was passed against the will of many states. He stresses that hostile 
propaganda to influence a situation in another state is illegal (but only if 
it can be proven that it was conducted by a foreign government and not 
private persons), yet in no circumstances is criticism of the internal politics of 
another State subversion, ‘if this criticism is substantiated by facts’ (ibid.: 6). 
This point brings us back to the difficulty mentioned in the above European 
study. There will be no agreement between Russia and the West as to what 
is meant by ‘criticism substantiated by facts’, especially in the feverish 
atmosphere at present, not just in Hong Kong but also more generally in 
the US and other Western countries’ attitudes to China. This has decisive 
implications for issues about the relationship between acts of subversion 
and foreign interference in the areas of freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, and academic freedom or cooperation beyond borders.
Standard Chinese international legal doctrine makes clear a connection 
between the rule of non-intervention of one state in the domestic affairs 
of another and the Bandung Principles (Shao 2008: 41). Shao Shaping 
is aware of the tendency of Western doctrine to wish to limit the rule of 
non-interference to overt, forceful intervention (2008: 41 et seq.). Instead, she 
argues, there is a broad prohibition of interference in each other’s internal 
affairs. Traditional Western international law must be understood as a 
legal ideology, that is to say, it is a weapon for criticising others, while the 
Bandung Principles reflect the needs of developing countries for respect. 
They represent an anti-hegemonic fight against the spirit of power politics 
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whereby state should take any measures to force another state to accept 
a specific ideology, social or political institution or intention. The range of 
what can be classed as a state’s internal affairs, according to Shao, include 
any kind of issue or activity related to politics, economics, society, military, 
culture, and diplomacy. ‘If a State employs agents to create panic in another 
State, funding anti-government activities, sending in spies etc… all of this is 
interference in the domestic affairs of another country’ (Shao 2008: 41–48).
3.2.2 Debate and public discourse
Shao’s perspective is not simply based on a forensic examination of the 
language of resolutions by the General Assembly. It is an expression of a 
widely held East Asian understanding of public discourse and interaction. 
It is deeply rooted in a Chinese philosophy that, in interpersonal relations, 
harmonious silence is advocated over critical debate. Chinese cultural 
tradition sees that a public discourse of an individual should be and will be 
born of rich emotions and good will. In the classic tradition, this is exemplified 
by Liu Xie’s The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons (Liu 2003). With 
Confucianism as its core guidance, the author explains how good writers 
aim to express their own emotions rather than defend their own points of 
view, and least of all attack other views with which they may not agree 
(ibid.). Qualities that Liu praises are emotion, courage, integrity, and creative 
talent. Each writer would be esteemed for their unique style generated from 
their own life experience. Liu describes how speakers give their personal 
perceptions of the world in a way that their feelings and emotions dominate. 
Chinese culture uses literature and poetry to stress dignity and openness 
to empathy. By contrast, for Aristotle, public discourse should not be too 
personal and emotional. Aesthetic implicitness is deeply rooted in Chinese 
culture. The beauty of writing or speech inspires the reader or listener to 
understand what is hidden in the heart of the creative author. A crucial 
difference in styles of diplomacy is therefore the implicit versus the explicit.
Liu believes the power of discourse to inspire and move the heart of 
the listener rests upon its capacity to bring alive the most excellent 
aspects of tradition, but never to challenge this tradition or argue with 
the listener. At the same time, discourse intends to represent power and 
authority in an inspiring way to encourage acceptance. Through it flows 
political power which influences the loyalty and belief of the people. 
In the Chinese tradition there is certainly a tendency to follow authority 
and to be scrutinised for political correctness, while for Westerners the 
focus is respect for facts and the truth, and ability to deliver argument 
in a reasoned, effective, and logical way. The outcome of the Chinese 
form of discourse is that it will usually communicate itself in expressive 
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ways, allowing for flexible and wide interpretations and leaving space 
for the audience to form their own understandings. Westerners will 
resist this, in the Aristotelian tradition, in favour of accurate, stable, 
precise rules. The objectivity excludes the subjective and personal.
3.3 Between cyber-sovereignty and the 
rules-based liberal democratic international order
Another legal field in which the Chinese–Western tension plays out 
is in the attempts at international regulation of cyberspace.
In 2015, President Xi Jinping set out clearly China’s understanding of 
multilateralism in the context of cyberspace, saying: ‘There should be no 
unilateralism. Decisions should not be made with one party calling all 
the shots or only a few parties discussing among themselves’ (Xi 2015a). 
There must be a full participation of all countries, through which, by 
consultation and dialogue, an equitable and just outcome acceptable to 
a majority of countries can be reached. This democratic approach should 
involve all stakeholders, including internet companies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and citizens, but China is clear that governments 
should be taking the lead with respect to public policy and security (MOFA 
2017). There is very much present in this way of thinking the conscious 
belief that rulemaking grows out of a density of interaction among a very 
wide variety of technological communities, internet companies, which 
will lead to a ‘multi-dimensional and well-coordinated governance 
framework’ (Xi 2019). At the same time, governments have the responsibility 
to draft the laws and policies in the light of their national conditions 
and contain the spread of cybersecurity risks. This should happen within 
international organisations such as the UN. Internet companies should 
commit themselves to law-based governance. Finally, individual citizens 
must ‘conscientiously regulate their own online behaviour’ (ibid.). 
In China’s view, the realistic perspective is to recognise that it is having to 
reorient a global cybersystem that is actually dominated by private Western 
companies, the ‘multi-stakeholders’. This brings China into solidarity with 
Russia, which considers the role of the multi-stakeholders to be exaggerated 
(Russian Federation 2021). China’s cybersecurity law of 2017 insists upon 
digital boundaries in order to protect its political, economic, and social 
systems from foreign intervention. It does this also by strictly controlling the 
inflow of information from abroad and ensuring no external dependence 
on cyber-technology. This is the way to avoid, in the words of President 
Xi Jinping, any situation whereby a country may ‘connive in or support cyber 
activities that undermine other countries’ national security’ (MOFA 2017). 
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The cyber-sovereignty approach leads China to prefer a hard law over a 
soft law approach to cyberspace regulation. It is so concerned about the 
possibility of the multi-stakeholders (private companies within the Western 
liberal democratic order) endeavouring to undermine its social, economic, 
and political structures that it would prefer to apply precise legal standards 
to cyberspace. In the UN Group of Government Experts (GGE), China required 
reference to sovereignty in its reports and, along with Cuba and Russia, 
insisted on there being no reference to self-defence and humanitarian law 
on the grounds that this could invite technologically advanced countries 
to launch attacks on other nations, threatening their governments.
With Russia, China set up a parallel group called the Open-Ended 
Working Group (OEWG), open to all UN members instead of just the 25 
of the GGE. There, China proposes that a consensus on non-binding 
norms should be translated ‘into a more binding international instrument’ 
(OEWG 2018). While China has the support of many developing countries, 
the US thinks general international law can apply (United States 2020). 
Such a general law, in China’s view, which is based on ill-defined custom 
and shaped through Western (specifically European) history, can be 
interpreted in different ways. It therefore needs to be replaced by a freshly 
drafted and precise international treaty. This is the true meaning of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics: new standards drafted freely and 
in precise terms by China with other developing countries (Xinhua 2017).
What China is really bringing to the surface here is a fundamental point 
about the structural history of international law and order. The recognition 
that the world has never had a complete international legal order, only 
a Western- (and European-) led order to which the rest of the world 
has never officially consented, is the perspective developed by He and 
Sun (2019). In the new context of cyberspace, this order is not currently 
regulated at all. So, it is up to each sovereign state to negotiate a new 
and explicit order, in a dialectical struggle which reflects all their interests. 
And the most appropriate mechanism for this is a new multilateral treaty.
3.4 Governance and civil society: Chinese 
reflections
In addition to this analysis of international law, it is worth stating that China 
would not accept the widely presented Western interpretation of Chinese 
society in which civil society is excluded from the system of government 
and the state permeates everywhere in society. The opinions of the Chinese 
thinkers Yu Keping and Cai Tuo are quoted extensively here, and we stress the 
extent to which they reflect official thinking. The primary duality is between 
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government and governance, the former resting strictly on obeying law while 
the latter engages the whole of society, particularly at an ethical level. 
First, Yu Keping:
Governance is different from government, it refers to the use of public 
authority by government and/or non-governmental organizations 
to manage social and political affairs, maintain public order and 
meet the needs of the public. Good governance means that the 
government and the people co-govern social affairs, which is the 
best situation of the relationship between the state and society.
The decision on comprehensively promoting the rule of law passed by 
the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee puts 
forward such an important proposition: ‘good law is the premise of 
good governance.’ The political report of the 19th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China once again emphasized that: ‘we 
should promote scientific, democratic and legal legislation, promote 
development with good laws and ensure good governance.’ This 
means that China’s top leadership has officially regarded good 
governance as the ideal goal of China’s political development.
As the cooperative management of public affairs between the 
government and citizens, good governance needs the joint efforts of the 
government and citizens. Moreover, with the development of society and 
the progress of politics, the role of citizens in the management of public 
affairs will become increasingly important. However, so far, among all 
the power subjects, the government undoubtedly has the overwhelming 
importance, and no other power subject can be compared with the 
government. The government is still the ‘locomotive’ of social progress, the 
officials are still the ‘driver of human political train’, and the government 
still plays a decisive role in the realization of good governance.
A new state governance model is gradually taking shape in China. From 
the perspective of comparative politics, this new model has the following 
features, enabling the laws and ethical doctrines to play their respective 
roles... As the ideal state of governance, good governance entails the 
partnership of the government and citizens in public affairs management 
and implies the optimal functioning of the state and the society. In the 
process of speeding up governance modernization and striving for good 
governance, China has to pay sufficient attention to some general trends, 
including from the monolithic model of governance to the multi-actor 
model of governance, from centralization to decentralization, from the 
disproportionate roles of individuals to the prevalence of the rule of law, 
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from regulation to service, and from closeness to openness. 
(Yu 2019: 28–30)
Second, Cai Tuo:
‘China model’ is a social development model that begins to pay attention 
to social function, tap social potential and play the role of society. It is 
aware of the real existence of social space outside the traditional political 
fields such as the state and the government and its indispensable role 
in promoting social development. It is aware of the significance of social 
harmony in resolving social contradictions, gathering social forces and 
promoting citizen participation. Therefore, it advocates the establishment 
of a harmonious society. This shows a new direction, that is, the transition 
from state politics to non-state politics... It is a more forward-looking 
strategic change to expand from a purely state perspective to a non-state 
perspective, and to give full play to social forces, including domestic civil 
society and global civil society. It not only reflects China’s progress with the 
times more truly, but also makes China stand in the forefront of the times. 
(Cai 2005: 13)
Non-state actors are increasingly active and rising. When we look at 
today’s international environment, it is obviously unwise to ignore the 
role of NGOs and global civil society. Non-state actors are influencing 
the issues, procedures and processes of international relations from 
multiple fields and levels, thus restricting the grand strategy of all 
countries... The rise of non-state politics, whether in the shifting global 
politics or in the downward group politics, has demonstrated the role 
of non-state actors (e.g. international organizations, civil society and 
NGOs) at different levels. They actively participate in public life and 
share the function and authority of managing social life to varying 
degrees. This kind of political transformation shows the future trend 
of politics, which cannot be ignored by China’s grand strategy.
The process of legalization has been accelerated, while the process of 
democratization has lagged behind. After the reform and opening up, 
the process of the rule of law in Chinese society is obviously accelerated, 
and the concept of the rule of law is increasingly popular, which makes 
the social and political life more standardized and orderly. Comparatively 
speaking, the process of democratization is far away from people’s 
expectation and does not fully meet the actual needs. 
(Cai 2006: 5–7)
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3.5 Wider Western responses to the nature of 
a human rights-based international order 
There is recognition on the part of consultants to the Carnegie Foundation 
(Williams 2020) and the Royal United Services Institute (Chalmers 2019), 
that there is not at present an established liberal democratic international 
order to be defended. Instead, there is a Western conviction that it is 
the most sound and decent way for the world community to develop. 
Since this aspiration translates into security concerns, it is acutely 
relevant to otherwise distinct issues such as development finance.
The 2021 UK defence review insists that the distinction between national 
security and economy is illusory, while it is clear that national security for 
the West is bound up with the idea of open society and transparency. A 
state which does not have universal suffrage and controls all information 
within its jurisdiction will therefore have its intentions in international 
affairs viewed with serious uncertainty. So, the defence review calls for 
the integration of the logic of diplomacy, development, intelligence, and 
security. It further recognises that the issue is how to manage an increasingly 
contested international order, where multipolarity is the rule and the 
centre of gravity is moving towards the Indo–Pacific (HM Government 
2021: 24–26). With China as by far the most significant competitor in the 
multipolar contest to shape the international environment, it states that 
a priority for the UK is to increase the capacity to understand China in the 
context of this struggle – as the UK sees it – between an authoritarian 
and liberal perspective on how the world should develop (ibid.: 27–28). 
There is currently little evidence that either China or the West will 
concede their positions. The battleground is between the West and 
China for the hearts and minds of the nation states of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. For instance, a major contestation between the West 
and China is about the nature of the latter’s supposedly authoritarian 
government. The central feature of Bai’s argument is a hybrid form of 
government which has a meritocratic element as well as a popular 
element. His claim that the management of contemporary society is far 
too complex for even highly educated citizens to understand effectively 
can hardly be contested. However, there is also a crisis surrounding 
the authority of experts in the West, leading to the spread of populism 
which argues that experts are not impartial but part of a ruling class and 
therefore acting partly in their own interests (Davies 2018; Carty 2021). 
In the West, it difficult to see any way out of this dilemma. The cardinal 
principle of its individualist democracy is itself populist, in that people 
are sovereign and it is impossible to tell them that they are wrong – and 
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therefore not entitled to final political authority. The progress of universal 
suffrage since the nineteenth century has been based on the principle 
that exclusive franchises were exploited for the economic interest of 
those holding them (Leigh 2018). However, the evidence that popular 
votes can be easily manipulated and the recognition that issues of 
government are incredibly complex are now so overwhelming that 
many in the ‘third world’ are likely to be inclined towards the Chinese 
model and the arguments of Bai. It might be said that the governance 
of the EU retains large parts of a hybrid philosophy, with the European 
Commission appointed while the Parliament is directly elected. In which 
case a pragmatic approach to European–Chinese relations may well 
be able to reach some common ground. However, the present climate 
of opinion in Europe about human rights in China has led the Parliament 
to suspend further deliberation of the CIA between the EU and China.
Western reflections on China are, for the most part, based on external 
observations of Chinese practice and extrapolate Western ideological 
descriptions to superimpose a particular picture of Chinese intentions. 
In short, they express Western convictions, for example that China 
wishes to keep civil society under state control as much as possible, 
and that China recognises the importance of development for stability 
and peacekeeping but does not believe in endeavouring to construct 
new civil and political institutions, apart from encouraging economic 
development and providing infrastructure. The Western discussion 
recognises that the conflict with China in these fields concerns not its 
own relations with China, but rather shaping the global discourse and 
winning over the global South – where the competition is focused. 
3.6 Human rights and developmental peace
Since 2013, China has taken a more active role in the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) (Piccone 2018). Piccone argues that China aims 
to promote what it calls ‘orthodox interpretations of national sovereignty 
and non-interference in internal affairs that weaken international norms 
of human rights, transparency, and accountability’ (ibid.: 1). On the other 
hand, He (2019) and De Coning and Osland (2020) argue for the idea of 
‘developmental peace’, which focuses on securing an environment for 
economic development without facilitating political institutions along 
Western lines. In the view of these authors, the cumulative effect of both 
Chinese policies (in the UNHRC and in favour of developmental peace) is to 
direct attention away from furthering a global liberal democratic order.
Piccone complements the work of Kinzelbach by tracing the types 
of resolutions China has had passed or tried to pass in the UNHRC. 
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This environment, for Piccone, allows states more power to interpret 
‘lawfulness’ and thereby takes away the power from NGOs, whether 
Chinese or from other countries. This replaces what China would consider 
a confrontational relationship between the state and civil society with a 
more harmonious one. Just as Kinzelbach noticed, Piccone also remarks 
how China stresses the necessity of economic development for the 
fulfilment of human rights, although not clarifying how to balance the 
claims of economic rights (satisfied by economic development) with civil 
and political rights, which may be neglected in the Chinese pathway 
to development. Piccone assumes reality to be inevitably conflictual, 
meaning that economic and political rights are bound to clash. In a similar 
vein, Piccone notes that China seems to want to encourage a diplomatic 
conversation about the nature of human rights rather than facilitate 
a judicial process of adjudicating state violations of human rights. 
The fundamental issue for China, in Piccone’s view, is control of civil society. 
Here there is a divergence in perspective from Yu Keping and Cai Tuo. 
Piccone sees that ensuring civil society organisations operate in a legal way 
gives states the power to repress them if desired. The unifying principle of 
the Chinese perspective is absolute territorial sovereignty. As such, China 
has tried unsuccessfully to introduce language into the UNHRC resolutions 
recognising states’ internal sovereignty, which would give international 
legitimacy to the repression of minorities in the autonomous Tibetan and 
Xinjiang Uighur regions. Piccone’s overall interpretation is that China wants to 
remove from the UNHRC resolutions mention of anything that would provide 
a conducive environment for civil society to operate. For Yu Keping and Cai 
Tuo, the objective of an active civil society shapes the whole development 
of China’s domestic life. Clearly there is a clash of interpretations here. 
Piccone correctly points to the coalition of like-minded ‘authoritarian’ 
countries which support China in the Human Rights Council as having 
a large percentage of the vote in the UNHRC, although not going 
unchallenged. Full support comes from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Other states which 
usually, but do not always support China, are Ethiopia, El Salvador, 
Iraq, Nigeria, and the Philippines. These states appear to share China’s 
commitment to state-led development. China will receive intermittent 
support from some African countries while Western Europe, North 
America, Japan, and Australasia will usually try to oppose China. 
Additionally, UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, is relevant to 
governance, of which human rights is a part. While China may be formally 
opposed to intervention in the domestic affairs of states, it is very prominent 
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in participating in peacekeeping operations within a developmental 
framework. He (2019) argues that China is actively promoting developmental 
peace over the idea of a liberal peace. Developmental peace emphasises 
the strong state leading the development process while political and 
social stability come from strong institutions. De Coning and Osland 
(2020) agree with the idea that peace comes from economic stability 
and that development which mirrors the Chinese approach is achieved 
not through imposition but through imitation. Economic development 
assistance via aid with no conditions attached means there will be no talk 
of strengthening democracy, the rule of law, or individual human rights. Both 
De Coning and Osland (2020) and He (2019) note that the two different 
concepts of peace are not necessarily mutually exclusive and incompatible. 
However, insofar as peacekeeping forces are also working for economic 
development, there are characteristically Chinese ways of collaborating.
In the view of De Coning and Osland (2020), the Chinese are able 
to play a more effective peacekeeping role in both Mali and South 
Sudan because they are liked and trusted for their business-like 
approach. In the Sudan the Chinese share economic interests with 
both sides of the civil war and therefore offers an equal economic 
incentive to the two parties to try to diffuse potential violence.
The general question remains of whether liberal democracy improves 
the efficiency and equity of economic development in the course of 
conflict resolution in the global South. Western interpreters of Chinese 
practice will always tend to be sceptical and, in some recent cases, 
with good cause. Recently, China has vetoed proposed resolutions of 
the Security Council, calling not merely for humanitarian assistance in 
the conflict in Ethiopia but also demanding a ceasefire of hostilities.  
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4. Chinese Confucianism:  
implications for the nature 
of multilateralism and 
international organisation
It will be argued in this section that there is a distinctive Chinese way 
of approaching multilateral diplomacy with regards to the structure of 
international organisations and multilateral treaties. This means delving 
more deeply into the historical and sociological aspects of the impact 
of Confucianism on Chinese behaviour. The fundamental text on the 
construction of the discipline of sociology in China is Xiaotong Fei’s 
(1992) From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society. Fei’s thinking 
is outlined in contrast with standard Western thinking to consider how 
these differences are also reflected in Chinese diplomacy. While the 
Chinese perspective is aware of the Western one and considers itself in 
relation to it, this is not reciprocated. Indeed, the Western perspective 
is not clearly aware of the Chinese perspective (except as being 
something deviant), and furthermore considers itself as universal. There 
is a recurring complaint from the West that China has not followed their 
expectations to assimilate despite an invitation to become a stakeholder 
in their world, causing them to feel disappointed – even deceived. 
4.1 Social regulation
As a sociologist, Fei points in the direction of unconscious, inherited 
thought and behavioural patterns of Chinese people generally, which is 
possible to recognise in the ways they organise themselves and relate to 
other groups. Quite apart from the point that the Chinese government 
revives classical Chinese philosophy in official matters today, the 2,000-
year history of the country will inevitably unconsciously shape the 
behaviour of Chinese people in both the public and private sector.
The far-reaching influence of Chinese people around the world does 
not follow a specific blueprint. Some reviewers have suggested that 
this is either a lack of overall coordination or a deliberate ploy to keep 
China’s strategies opaque and therefore flexible and adaptable. 
The assumption underlying the exposition of Heng Wang (2019, 2020) 
and Jakóbowski (2018) on multilateralism is that Fei provides the 
most likely explanation of Chinese behaviour: the overall Chinese 
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motivation is largely driven by habit, reproducing the way in which 
Chinese society functions domestically at the international level.
Fei’s view of Chinese ethics is not unproblematic, but its value is that it may 
provide another framework within which to analyse Chinese multilateralism. 
Fei believes that Chinese organisational thinking is based on the experience 
of rural, agricultural and village life, as opposed to modernised, industrial, 
and urban life. Since Chinese society has been radically transforming 
from rural to urban, his thinking might appear redundant. However, the 
argument here is that the influence of rural, traditional (i.e. Confucian) society 
continues to dominate. In the 1940s, Fei remarked that when any Chinese 
person is asked where they come from, they answer with the homeland of 
their ancestors. This connection endures today with Chinese returning to 
their hometown from across the country every Chinese Spring Festival. 
Also paradoxical is Fei’s thesis that the Confucian ethic is completely 
egocentric. The individual is expected to learn self-restraint, to discipline 
himself, and, in this way, acquire the capacity to build relations with 
others through a benevolence which extends outwards from himself to 
his family, from the family to society, and from society to the wider world. 
At the same time, the essence of this self-restraint and discipline is that 
the individual learns to adapt and adjust himself to the existing society 
that has preceded him. Confucius says that a son who is respectful of his 
father will rarely be inclined to get into dispute with the state authorities. 
The central feature of this analogy of extending the family to all 
human relations is that it depends upon the building up of personal 
relations to explain the evolution of the whole of social organisation. 
It holds that individual loyalty – meaning sincerity and trust – is the 
fundamental glue of social organisation. It depends upon a constant 
cultivation of personal relations. Agreements are an expression of a 
relationship at a particular time and must be continuously sustained. 
Social organisation is a function of the expansion of individual personal 
relationships which criss-cross, interact, and network with one another.
In imperial China, all relations would ideally eventually lead back to the 
Emperor, whose rule was a function of a vastly extended notion of the 
imperial family to the whole country. The stress in Confucianism is on the 
importance of the benevolent ruler (as opposed to a self-centred tyrant) 
who has the character of ren – meaning humanity or benevolence – which is 
the foundation of his capacity to sustain a harmonious political society. The 
quality of these extended personal relations is always dynamic, holding the 
potential to flourish further, but equally the possibility to wilt and fragment.
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4.1.1 Rites
The basis of the Confucian way of thinking is the experience of the 
rural community. The capacity to practice self-discipline and restraint 
is represented in the learning of the rites. Rites refer to the accepted 
ways of behaving in typical situations that occur frequently. It is the 
responsibility of the father to educate his children to learn these rites 
through repetition until they are internalised in the spirit of the individual.
In Western terms this amounts to a kind of customary law, especially if the 
latter is seen as resembling the English common law. The rites arise out of 
the experience of the community in dealing with particular situations, not 
unlike precedent in English law. Rites follow the experience of concrete 
situations and are always so specific that there are a multiplicity to be 
learned. Just as in the common law, if the rite is to be modified, this will be 
done by an interpretation which only very discretely alters its meaning, 
maintaining the appearance that it remains unaltered. There is not a strict 
procedure for enforcing rites. As the responsibility of the father, he would 
be to blame if this process of educational internalisation does not occur 
within his children. If the children do not behave correctly, they would 
ultimately be excluded from society. Enforcement therefore tends to be 
directed upwards in the hierarchy to the person responsible for those lower 
down in the social structure, the entire fabric of which is patriarchal.
References to common law are not explicitly in the text of Fei, but the concept 
of rite resembles common law much more closely than the international 
law idea of customary law, which is, in any case, obscure and controverted, 
but is widely assumed to mean an unconsciously developed practice 
dating back to a time when it was not yet binding law. The commonality 
between a Confucian rite and the idea of custom is that individuals do not 
choose the customs but are born into a society in which they exist. Rules 
and rites are constructed by the society through education and individuals 
must learn and follow them to remain part of the society. For the practice 
of multilateralism, arising out of this tradition where society is still to be 
constructed, the aim of a Confucian-infused ethos or ethic will be to set 
frameworks in which dense and detailed social practice can be stabilised, 
and in which a series of rites can arise from experience of precedents.
4.1.2 Political governance 
Fei contrasts this Confucian approach to social regulation to the Western 
idea of law with much the same understanding of Western individualism 
as Bai. The West has an idea of what Bai called the innate natural rights of 
individuals which precede and are quite independent from society. The rights 
to freedom and equality attach automatically to the individual and his formal 
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consent is necessary to any derogation. Fei adds the dimension of God 
and Christianity, which is essential to the Western idea that law transcends 
human beings and regulates them. This divine law creates and legitimises the 
innate nature of the individual, created by God as free and equal. Individuals 
are governed by law and not by persons; far from being enmeshed in 
society, individuals are quite separated from one another. Any decision to 
deviate from the contractual order is taken as a matter of conscious will. 
A political society is based on a constitution that provides the basis 
for governance within a nation. In the same way that this is necessary, 
international relations give rise to the need to form institutions that 
supervise relationships between national political societies. This 
arrangement also ensures that all participants observe the terms of 
the contract and criteria for membership. If not, the latter would lapse. 
Further, the member could simply withdraw should they so desire.
Thinking in terms of the individual, however, this framework is not realistic as it 
does not account for the web of relationships that individuals are inextricably 
tied to from birth. It is not possible to simply extricate oneself from the planet. 
The idea of a rules-based domestic or international order assumes that 
individuals have contracted certain terms for regulating the space between 
them and that it is appropriate to have an independent mechanism to see 
that individuals comply, and are formally sanctioned if they do not. As will be 
explored further, the terms of contracts can sometimes be open to debate. 
4.2 Rules and institutions in Chinese multilateralism 
The literature on China’s practice of multilateralism is vast, but the aim here 
is to examine how certain features of China’s BRI, are absolutely central to 
understanding how it will shape normative approaches to international 
order. Its multilateral initiatives, vis-á-vis the European 16+1 and the Africa 
and East Asian relationships, will then be considered more briefly.
Even Chinese commentators appear to present Chinese practices 
apologetically in comparison with Western approaches to normativity, 
without fully considering the possibility that the Chinese may have 
profoundly different views of how to construct international relationships. 
This report also posits that Chinese policymakers are themselves not fully 
aware of how their own history influences and shapes their approach. This 
mutual lack of self-consciousness, it is believed, is a significant principal 
reason for Western fear and lack of trust of China. It is perceived as an 
expanding power whose apparently irresistible rise must be contained.
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It will be argued here that, given the deep structural aspects underlying 
China’s approach to multilateralism, striving for global hegemony is not a 
likely intention and, once China’s approach is understood, all that is required 
is some form of compromise between two very distinctive approaches 
to normativity.
4.2.1 Lessons from the BRI on the nature of Chinese normativity 
and rulemaking
Two articles by Heng Wang (2019, 2020) consider the BRI from the perspective 
of characteristics of normativity. He makes no mention of a conscious 
Chinese intention to spread benevolence abroad, nor to personalise 
rather than institutionalise international relations, instead attributing the 
Chinese practice to a pragmatic response to the nature of the BRI as 
an activity. China’s actions in this policy area are broad, complex, and 
unpredictable, requiring extreme flexibility. However, the argument here 
is that, with few exceptions, this approach will reproduce itself more and 
more distinctively in China’s approaches to international relations.
Heng Wang stresses that the megaregional nature of the BRI means it 
is central to understanding China’s approach to international economic 
law (Wang 2020). His article reflects on hundreds of what he calls 
primary agreements between China and other countries. Generally, he 
says these are not law, nor politics. The agreements emphasise project 
development, not rule development, by which he means not that China 
is careless about the search for the highest standards, but that it has 
a distinctive way of aiming to achieve them (ibid.). President Xi Jinping 
expressed this himself in a speech at the Second Belt and Road Forum:
We should strive to achieve the goals of high standards, benefiting 
people’s livelihood and sustainable development, introduce rules and 
standards generally supported by all parties, and promote enterprises 
to carry out project construction, operation, procurement, bidding and 
other links in accordance with generally accepted international rules and 
standards, while respecting the laws and regulations of various countries. 
We must adhere to the people-centred development philosophy, focus 
on eradicating poverty, increasing employment, and improving people’s 
livelihood, so that the results of the ‘Belt and Road’ joint construction 
will better benefit all people, and make tangible contributions to local 
economic and social development, while ensuring commercial and 
financial sustainability, to achieve good beginning and good ending, good 
work and good accomplishment. 
(Xi 2019)
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Heng Wang distinguishes three characteristics that would need to be 
present to make the agreements law-like. First, there is not a precise 
statement of obligations from the parties. Second, there is not a delegation 
of responsibility to third parties to interpret the agreement and ensure 
compliance. Third, the objectives to be achieved are presented in broad 
parameters and are not precisely delineated (Wang 2020). Instead, the 
agreement speaks of cooperation among the parties to ensure that 
the project is faithfully implemented (ibid.). Mechanisms of concrete 
collaboration are to be found to ensure specific projects will carry out 
the political will of the leaders (ibid.). Wang reflects that from a Western 
perspective, weak legalisation means that imprecise norms are most 
often interpreted and applied by the very actors whose conduct they 
are supposed to govern. The room for discretion left by the terms of the 
agreements means there is difficulty in assessing compliance (ibid.). 
Of course, while the BRI should be multilateral because it involves numerous 
states, China is usually the one taking the initiative. All primary agreements 
are signed with China, which has blueprints which usually explicitly exclude 
the application of international law. China stresses connectivity, but above 
all understanding on usually five priorities: policy coordination, person-
to-person bonds, financial integration, unimpeded trade, and facilitating 
software connectivity (ibid.). Yet for all this colossal expansion of China, there 
is no central institution for the making of formal rules for the BRI. Instead, it 
is repeated that issues such as the distributive consequences of actions 
under the BRI for different state actors – in contexts of diverging legal and 
political cultures – require continuous understanding and coordination (ibid.).
In short, there is minimal institutionalisation in the BRI. The exercise 
is seriously concerned about results, namely achieving a massive 
material connectivity through infrastructure, but this is to be achieved 
through continuous collaboration in networks of relationships. In Wang’s 
view, the structure is expected to ensure an expanding international 
environment favourable to China (Wang 2019: 35). However, President 
Xi Jinping repeatedly stresses mutuality of interest with no one 
side imposing its will, thereby indicating a readiness to reconsider 
relationships that one side sees as becoming unbalanced.
In response to questions about Asian infrastructure investment banks 
and improving the global governance structure, Xi Jinping pointed out: 
With the continuous development and changes of the world, with the 
increasing number of major transnational and global challenges faced 
by mankind, it is necessary to carry out corresponding adjustment and 
reform of the global governance system and mechanism. This kind of 
60Research Report Volume 2021 Number 85 
Theory and Practice in China’s Approaches to Multilateralism and Critical 
Reflections on the Western ‘Rules-Based International Order’
ids.ac.uk
reform is not to make a new start, but to innovate and improve... To 
promote the development of the global governance system towards 
a more just, reasonable and effective direction, in line with the general 
needs of all countries in the world. China and the United States share 
extensive common interests in the field of global governance, and should 
jointly promote the improvement of the global governance system. This is 
not only conducive to the two countries giving full play to their respective 
advantages and strengthening cooperation, but also conducive to the 
cooperation between the two countries in promoting the resolution of 
major challenges faced by mankind... I don’t think any country in the world 
can tilt its global governance structure towards itself, nor do I think it is in 
line with the trend of the times. How to improve the global governance 
structure should be decided by all countries. The United Nations is about 
to hold a series of summits marking the 70th anniversary of its founding. 
China is willing to work with the majority of member States to promote the 
construction of a new type of international relations centred on win-win 
cooperation, improve the global governance structure, and jointly build a 
community of shared future for mankind. 
(Xi 2015b)
As Heng Wang stresses, it is very important for China that the UN Security 
Council has recognized the BRI as a regional development initiative 
(Wang 2019: 38). China is also developing related informal agreements 
with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), always avoiding 
treaties with measurable commitments, in favour of declarations of 
intent (ibid.: 41–43). These are not empty statements, but there is no 
formal state membership of the BRI as an institution (ibid.: 43). There 
is simply a framework to stimulate a network of collaboration.
It is not possible for China to predict exactly how the BRI will develop, 
with over 130 MoUs with as many states in an uncertain world climate. So, 
there is no reference to best standards or name-and-shame procedures. 
It is recognised that improving infrastructure over vast underdeveloped 
regions will have unpredictable consequences for trade and market 
access, given the asymmetrical relations between the various participants 
in the BRI. Instead, reliance is placed upon the momentum of continuing, 
willing networking, and collaboration (Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019). 
It is important for those concerned with Chinese hegemony to realise 
that the informality of agreements within the BRI means that explicit 
concessions to sovereignty are avoided. The BRI is a development strategy 
that does not try to impose any disciplines or restrictions on the domestic 
sovereignty of other countries. This informal strategy lowers sovereignty 
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costs and allows for ample trial and error, learning from mistakes what 
does not work in particular contexts. There is therefore vagueness around 
bidding procedures, labour and environmental standards. Everything is 
left to the relations between individual countries and China (ibid.: 49–51). 
That is why it isn’t possible to determine from reading the MoUs and 
subsequent agreements exact details on the balance of issues between 
political risk, project delay, cost overruns, and market concessions (ibid.: 
51–53). Yet the fundamental point remains that China sees the BRI as 
intended to build a more fair, equitable international order (ibid.: 54).
4.3 The Chinese institutional framework: 
hegemonic or inter-active? 
A contested question is whether Chinese multilateralism outside the existing 
institutions it has joined (such as the UN or the WTO) is an expression 
of multilateralism or bilateralism. In his review of Chinese-led regional 
multilateralism in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, 
Jakóbowski (2018) treats the two as intimately linked. The initiative to 
develop the relationship between China and these regions comes from 
China and, ultimately, in terms of economic relations (infrastructure 
projects, financial transfers, and trading), they have a bilateral character 
that is developed through the multilateral framework. The relations have 
something of a hub and spoke nature, although Jakobowski highlights the 
considerable scope for mutuality which China has accepted in practice. 
These types of activities produce normative relations that are identical 
to those which are described by Wang with respect to the BRI. More 
specifically, China’s conduct can be characterised, as both Bai and Fei 
help to understand, as an outward expansion of its relations to virtually 
the whole of the global South. It endeavours to recreate the ethos of the 
rural community in China through a China-centred (egocentric, according 
to Fei) interconnecting web of comprehensive relations with all key regions 
(apart from ASEAN, to which similar concepts apply). These relations are at 
all levels, from political leadership to business and personal interactions, 
and cover every conceivable subject, e.g. culture, politics, economics, 
society, health, and environment. The density and continuity of these 
relationships is intended to create communities of nations of which China is 
an integral part. The practices developed can gradually build up customs, 
or rites in the Chinese sense, as to how to interact with one another.
Jakóbowski concludes his critical and nuanced analysis by saying that 
the high intensity of political contacts developed by China enable it 
to establish multifaceted sectoral dialogues. In the particular case of 
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Central and Eastern Europe (the 16+1) people-to-people exchanges 
are increased which reshape local perceptions of China with multiple, 
flexible and adaptable platforms (Jakóbowski 2018: 673).
Central to the Chinese activity is dispensing financial support in various 
forms, usually tied to the transfer of Chinese technical expertise. It is 
possible to assume that China sees itself as behaving in the Mencian–
Confucian sense of extending its compassion and benevolence (ren) to 
others through the expansion of its radius of relationships. This entails a 
long-term aim to accustom the global South to a positive presence of 
Chinese people in habitual and routine relations of trust. The distinction 
between habit and rule remains crucial. A rule is separate from the 
person to whom it applies, while a habit refers to the usual ways of 
managing behaviour and relations. In contrast to Western approaches to 
development, there is no one-size-fits-all template, but a huge variety of 
context-based specific relationships which over time become routine.
Jakóbowski warns that, at least with respect to Europe, the pattern 
of voluntary, non-binding, and incremental institutional processes 
results in relatively slow processes of cooperation in his region 
(ibid.: 673). Generally, he says that China approaches Europe with 
its South–South models of cooperation, which, especially in the 
area of financial support, are not as attractive as EU funding. 
In any case, EU rules apply to 11 of the states in the region. 
He indicates that the overall pattern of organisation comes from within 
ministries within Beijing, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). It 
proposes agendas of activity in the absence of any international secretariat 
and voting mechanism. Jakóbowski recognises that this tends to be 
China-centric, but in practice it allows the regions (drawing also on their 
own regional structures), such as the African Union, ASEAN, and China/
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), to coordinate 
and modify general agendas so that it is not just China asymmetrically 
pushing a bilateral interest (Jakóbowski 2018: 663–5). There is significant 
participation by FOCAC, and China/Eastern Europe (16+1) in what functions 
as a reactive feedback loop. In particular, China has been ready to accept 
more multilateralism in Europe, and individual European countries take the 
coordinating initiatives in specific areas (e.g. maritime issues in Poland and 
transport in Serbia). This ensures that agency is shared (ibid.: 666–7). After all, 
the aim of constructing comprehensive dialogue mechanisms – in all possible 
areas of politics, culture, economics, health, social relations, and education – 
is to provide a community of vision which amounts to an alternative vision of 
global order (ibid.: 659). China’s perspective is long-term and comprehensive. 
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The aim of this analysis is to understand the institutional framework – or 
lack thereof – with which China engages comprehensively with the global 
South, but including Central and Eastern Europe, from a perspective which 
provides some insight into how China understands itself. The theoretical 
framework does not only rely upon the Confucian theories of Bai and Fei. 
It also mentions the realist nation state perspectives of He and Sun (2019) 
of which Jakóbowski is also aware. For He and Sun, the best hope for 
international order is that individual states are first clear in their own minds 
about what their interests are, after which they can engage in a dialectic 
struggle to achieve them. The outcome, at best, will be a compromise on 
the principle of searching for common ground while preserving differences.
In its development of multilateral relations with the global South, China has, 
according also to Jakóbowski, the aim of promoting a vision of a multipolar 
world of democratised international relations, by which it means the 
effective participation of all states bringing their own perspectives, rather 
than having a single model imposed upon them (by the US, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, for example). China, as a developing 
country and member of the global South, wishes to reshape the world 
(Jakóbowski 2018: 667). It endeavours to do this in every forum, especially 
FOCAC, but also in Latin America, the Arab World, and Southeast Asia 
(ibid.: 667–8). For this purpose, it is clear that these types of intense, 
multifaceted relationships – the more proactive and mutual the better 
– are ideal for the creation of the global village-rural community where 
states will habituate themselves into insisting upon particularist, context-
based solutions to their conflicting visions of international relations. The 
Central and Eastern European states (16+1) resist being drawn into this 
broad Chinese strategy, but regardless, Jakóbowski notes how they are 
encouraged to align themselves with China’s new Five-Year Plan. China 
has a realistic awareness of what the 16+1 regard as their core interest 
with the EU and develops its own relations directly with it (ibid.: 668–70).
At the same time, China has its own independent focus on its China-
centric economic issues, such as its excess capacity to construct offshore 
infrastructure (albeit also directly related to its trading ambitions). Its 
accumulated foreign reserves are intended to appeal to the national 
self-interest of the countries of the global South. Effectively, it is the 
huge financial resources of China, besides its increasing technical and 
industrial prowess, which provide the foundation for its capacity to 
project itself as a global leader (ibid.: 659, 669–70; Gu and Carey 2019). 
The multilateralism so far described is multilateralism created by China.
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5. Chinese multilateralism within 
established orders: case studies
5.1 Background
The most contentious issues about Chinese multilateralism arise around the 
Western unease that China is a revisionist power trying to change or even 
overthrow the existing international order. This issue is difficult to analyse 
because it is speculative about China’s long-term intentions and tries to 
interpret China’s immediate behaviour in the light of such speculations. 
The primary aim of this study is the hermeneutic journey to understand 
how China understands itself. As interpretations of others are always 
subjective, this is the most that can be attempted in humanist scholarship.
Western academic interpretations of the Chinese are perspective-
driven, giving rise to prejudice and rivalry-obsessed anxiety. At the same 
time, this study makes the assumption that (as already seen in his Wall 
Street Journal statement clearly directed towards the US), President 
Xi Jinping is not disposed to accept the rhetoric of the US president, 
Joe Biden, that America is back and will take the lead (Xi 2015b). 
The difficulty, reflected widely in the Western literature on China’s 
international development strategy, concerns the widely-held Western 
suspicion that China’s long-term intention is to use the tool of economic 
development to achieve political ends outside of normal economic activity, 
to shape multilateral practices to suit its own form of governance and, 
further, to increase its strategic and military profile. All this impacts what 
were traditionally regarded as simple matters of economic development.
A fundamental area is the nature of China’s international development 
financing, where China is concerned at its being blocked in the 
IMF and the World Bank, as well as other regional development 
banks, in the sense that its quota of voting shares will never come 
to reflect its relative importance in world trade and finance.
5.2 Development finance
5.2.1 The AIIB and democratisation of development banking
This section is primarily concerned with assessing how far the Chinese 
are contesting the rules of the Bretton Woods system on development 
financing. Bin Gu, from Beijing Foreign Studies University, begins his 
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description of Chinese multilateralism in the AIIB by setting out some US 
academic definitions of the concept of multilateralism. For example, it 
involves three or more states or institutions which act on generalised 
principles of conduct for classes of actions without regard to particular 
interests or strategic exigencies of particular states (Gu 2017: 138). 
Gu adds that President Xi Jinping expressed the hope that the AIIB 
could help foster a community of the shared future of mankind.
Gu stresses further that this is not only Chinese multilateralism, but Chinese 
multilateralism (ibid.: 144). This Chinese initiative breaks new ground by 
having, as well as a headcount, a hybrid, flexible quota system based upon 
a share formula which follows a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
This marks a break with the fixed quotas of the IMF and World Bank, which 
since 1945 have greatly favoured Western countries. GDP will favour China, 
but also many other developing countries – especially in East and South 
Asia. Because the share allocation formula follows a country’s GDP, this 
favours Asian member states and accords them 75 per cent of the vote 
share. The US retains the requirement of 85 per cent for the approval of 
any change in quotas based upon capital contributions, which Congress 
can use to block change. China has a 26 per cent voting power in the AIIB, 
which is a de facto veto over changes to the size of the Board of Directors 
and the appointment of the President. The policy is to have decision-
making by consensus, but since that is difficult, there is also a 75 per 
cent majority voting system by head count (Gu 2017: 144–51). In addition, 
China insists upon change in the Bretton Woods policy that a US national 
is president of the World Bank and a European national is president of 
the IMF. For the first time, a president of a major development bank was 
apparently elected solely on the basis of merit (Jin Liqun, a Chinese, was 
re-elected by the Board of Governors for a second five-year term starting 
in January 2021), and other senior offices are equally open (ibid.: 151–2). 
In the case of the AIIB, it is China’s wish that the development bank 
should operate under the highest commercial and technical standards, 
being ‘lean, green and clean’ and that Chinese companies should 
have to compete equally with other countries’ enterprises. It is part of 
its strategy to compel its companies to upgrade to international levels, 
also in areas where it already has a competitive edge such as railways, 
telecommunication, construction, and e-commerce (ibid.: 146).
However, a crucial difference with Bretton Woods comes with the 
manner of negotiating loans with countries. In contrast to the Western 
strategy of an external, expert-imposed regime of structural adjustment 
which favours the private sector so as to produce hard currency-
earning exports rather than public expenditure on education, health, 
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infrastructure, and so on, the AIIB philosophy is quite different. First, 
the GDP-share voting formula favours developing countries, hence 
the prioritisation of their interests in AIIB policy. Second, the Founding 
Members voting system gives Asian states, especially smaller ones, 
effective participation in banking policy. Less developed countries may 
contribute half of their subscription in their own currency (ibid.: 154).
Most fundamentally, and as already indicated, the actual conditions 
on loans are different from the Bretton Woods system. The aim is to 
achieve both high and feasible standards. The standards (in terms of the 
economic and technical aspects of the project) must be high to allow 
the AIIB to continue to have access to international capital markets and 
cooperate with other multilateral development banks (MDBs). However, 
the conditions must also be feasible. So, as Gu puts it, ‘the AIIB is advised 
to take an ex post monitoring approach, which demonstrates a feature 
of democracy in interaction with borrowing countries, rather than the 
traditional ex ante ESS [World Bank environmental and social assessment] 
requirement’; although Gu notes that is also changing (ibid.: 156). The 
stress is that the bank project requires meaningful communication with 
stakeholders at national and subnational levels, as well as directly 
with the private sector and those affected by the project. The key is 
to avoid the failure of so many past projects that were based on an 
approach that did not take account of local conditions or context. 
This case study by Gu shows how China sees the true face of the liberal 
democratic international order led by the US. The latter is a hegemon 
which imposes a one-size-fits-all program of fiscal austerity, privatisation 
and market orientation. This appears multilateral, but allies of the US 
have little choice but to follow it. China is providing an alternative choice 
for under-represented developing countries. This does not mean China 
is forcefully inserting itself as an alternative hegemon, even if the US 
continues to boycott the AIIB (ibid.: 157). The Chinese strategy is to use its 
capital surplus to facilitate a mutuality in the formulation of development 
finance policy and practice, through a democratisation of the international 
economic order. This is particularly hard for Western countries to accept, 
as it challenges their primary charge against China: that it opposes 
democratisation. Indeed, China’s development finance, in Western eyes, is 
supposed to include the export of its authoritarian governance model to 
the global South. China would consider that the very opposite of the truth. 
However, there is the domestic aspect of economic governance, where the 
discussion of human rights takes place. Here, Bai’s comments on a Western 
‘one man, one vote’ system versus hybrid government come into play. 
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5.2.2 The BRI
In the area of Chinese development finance, the primary area of 
Western attention is probably the BRI and its precursors in Africa 
and Asia. Goldstein directs attention to the BRI as a solely Chinese 
initiative, arising out of the already functioning state-owned China 
Silk Road Fund, the China Development Bank and the China Export-
Import (Exim) Bank. Here, in Goldstein’s view, ‘one finds no undertaking 
to follow best practices, as with the AIIB, only a narrow economic 
purpose of transportation networks’ (Goldstein 2020: 185–6).
Political science literature can do little more than collect publicly 
expressed opinions, and this is what Goldstein does here. China’s rivals, 
the US and India, consider China a revisionist state and a threat to US 
prosperity and security. The BRI is seen by its critics as a narrowly self-
interested economic enterprise to gain political leverage over other 
countries (ibid.: 195). India and the US are calling the BRI debt diplomacy. 
However, Goldstein points out that analysts say the evidence does not 
support such a charge. He cites Brautigam most prominently for this 
view (ibid.: 196). So, Goldstein asks: why the alarmism? It is because the 
terms of China’s deals supposedly remain opaque, creating suspicion. 
Even proof in some cases that there is no debt diplomacy does not prove 
conclusively that in no cases China has not attempted this (ibid.: 197).
As has been seen in the earlier discussions about the BRI and in the context 
of the cultural anthropology explained by Fei, suspicious Westerners are 
looking for terms, specifically legal terms, in China’s agreements with 
other countries. In their absence, the West becomes uneasy. Yet, as has 
been shown, such clear legal terms would not adequately represent or 
characterise the relationships that China may be developing in the BRI 
regions. Instead, China is being asked by external third parties to prove 
something indefinable about the quality of its relations with BRI countries, on 
the assumption that their association with China needs special explanation. 
Goldstein draws particular attention to China’s discontinuing of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
conditionality regime. While they are voluntary guidelines, these principles 
still embody what Fei would regard as the external, objective standards that 
Western individualism requires. For instance, the aid agency must have a 
clearly defined role within an institutional structure. The evaluating process 
should be impartial and independent from the process concerned with 
policymaking and with the delivery and management of assistance. The 
evaluation process must be as open as possible with the results made widely 
available (OECD 1991: 4). These requirements make little sense in the context 
of a Confucian understanding of how loyal and trustworthy relationships 
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can be established. The very insistence upon the results being made widely 
available indicates the wish to make the BRI development activity as 
impersonal as possible, the very opposite of what China hopes to achieve.
5.2.3 Western views of Chinese motives
A literature review of Chinese development assistance shows how far 
Western analysis is, from an external perspective, trying to ascertain 
Chinese motives by interpreting its outward behaviour. This is done without 
access to Chinese intentions, even when explicitly expressed, as these will 
be distrusted. The first motive attributed to China is that it is acting in its 
own interests by giving development assistance, whether purely economic 
or also geopolitical. The second is that this does not contradict China’s 
desire to adopt a constructive international order in which many other 
countries, especially developing countries, can benefit. The third view in 
the literature is that China does not have a clearly defined overall position 
about its strategy, but is advancing pragmatically, step-by-step. 
An example of the first motive attributed to China – that it acts only 
in its own self-interest – is presented by Huang (2016) who argues that 
China’s policy is determined by its need for new outlets for its surplus 
productive capacity. A related ‘possible’ Chinese motive (i.e. purely 
speculative) is that China is using the BRI to obtain greater international 
economic influence by creating its own international economic system 
(ibid.). This is another way of expressing what Fei would call a Confucian 
expansion of the self and the creation of a global Chinese village. 
Western scholars can also guess that this Chinese policy is a reaction 
against a deliberate American (and maybe also European) strategy 
to exclude China as far as possible from new trading regimes like the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). China was, after all, originally admitted 
to the WTO on relatively unfavourable terms (Shaffer and Gao 2018). 
Whatever the stated principles of the BRI, liberal Western nations 
perceive see it as antagonistic for three main reasons: fears of greater 
influence of a communist power; economic/ideological issues surrounding 
the blurred lines between state-owned and private enterprise; and 
fears of threats to economic superiority, in that China challenges 
US hegemony in Asia and indeed in the world (Huang 2016). 
The same line of questioning of Chinese motivations in relation to the 
AIIB would point to China being denied greater participation in the 
Bretton Woods organisations, through the US congress blocking reform 
of the Asian Development Bank and IMF (Ren 2016). The usual arguments 
about searching for influence and unloading excess capacity also arise, 
without taking into account how other nation states have behaved in 
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comparison (ibid.). Foot repeats the same arguments and offers evidence 
of the success of China in reassuring neighbours of its positive motives 
(Foot 2020). He also shows how seven of ten Heads of State of the ASEAN, 
alongside 29 leaders and 1,500 delegates, attended the Belt and Road 
Forum in Beijing in May 2017, with 78 countries signing up to China-backed 
projects in their countries. Foot confirms Fei’s Confucian perspective about 
Chinese approaches to multilateralism by remarking how the bilateral or 
multilateral basis of many of these projects has led to improved relations 
between the countries in question, and even claims that this has led to 
security cooperation and agreements on some territorial disputes. Foot 
makes the argument that while Xi Jinping is only calling for China to 
have an equal standing with the US, this is somehow a ‘confrontational 
stance’, and speculates that in fact China really intends to expel the 
US from the Asian region so that it can be the hegemonic power.
In the field of development finance, the most common argument has 
been that China is engaged in a pattern of debt-trap diplomacy, forcing 
countries to accept loans which cannot be repaid. In this way, they 
may abandon strategic assets, submit to pressure on the repatriation 
of dissidents to China, and accept Chinese policies on the likes of Tibet, 
Xinjiang and Taiwan. It is said that China has a one-model-fits-all policy 
for development with its debt diplomacy, despite the fact that long-
term infrastructure projects cannot be financed any other way and that 
the international capital is not otherwise available except from China.
Here, it is again a matter of external interpretation of motives par 
excellence – the leading authority being Deborah Brautigam. Brautigam 
has discussed many cases in Angola, Mozambique, Djibouti, and Sri Lanka 
and, although it is not worth repeating her arguments here, we will briefly 
revisit some details of the Sri Lanka case. Her method is to offer that 
there is objective evidence of sound commercial and strategic military 
reasons for China’s conduct (Brautigam 2020). These include the desire 
to access resources in Angola, repayment in the form of oil in Venezuela, 
and a port in Djibouti to project influence across a US-dominated region 
(China faced competition from Dubai to finance this port, demonstrating 
the commercial attraction). The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka is the 
only case of Chinese asset seizure. However, this was a fire sale by the 
new Sri Lankan government (not only to China) to lower the country’s 
debt which stood at 57 per cent of GDP. The asset purchase was by a 
different Chinese company to the entity that made the original loan. 
Perhaps there is a certain irony in a final series of comments on Chinese 
motivation, which is that there is a lack of clarity in its intentions, attributable 
either to the lack of institutional coherence in the organisation of its 
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outward strategy, or because of conflicting and unreconciled goals, 
or simply because China has not itself, as a political entity, worked out 
clearly what its objectives are. This broad line of reflection is perhaps 
not so far removed from the intentional, internal perspective, drawing 
on Fei, that China’s approach to overseas development is largely 
intuitive, reflecting its own internal social organisation based upon rural 
customary practices. Hameiri and Jones (2018: 573) say that China’s 
development finance is the result of agencies, private and public, leading 
to ‘contested fragmentation, decentralization and internationalization 
of state apparatuses’. This means that China’s global economic policy 
will be ‘unintended and non-strategic in nature’ (ibid.: 573). Huang (2016) 
also believes there is a lack of institutional coordination in China. 
Narins and Agnew (2019) again adopt the conspiratorial approach that 
China is deliberately concealing its overall intentions, particularly the 
geopolitical, as a useful fuzziness, with Beijing deliberately not defining its 
motives nor its geopolitical identity. More sympathetically, they recognise 
that China is new as a global actor and will not be sure about how to 
preserve its role of non-interference with the other countries it must 
now interact intensively with, and upon whom it will inevitably become 
dependent. The two authors believe that as China becomes more 
economically important on the global stage it will have to create a new, 
geopolitical identity. However, Narins and Agnew point out that China has 
not yet produced a map for the BRI and its intended goals. They cannot 
resist implying that China will not be in a hurry to so define itself, preferring to 
pursue differing and possibly conflicting goals within the same strategy. This 
allows China to potentially pursue different goals within the same strategy 
without having to fully align itself with potentially conflicting objectives. 
The Western literature insists that the main issue for debate is the motivation 
and intention of the Chinese government in its multilateral development 
strategy. The official Chinese narrative is that China is a developing country 
that has suffered extensive colonial-style exploitation. It now wishes to 
bring the benefits of its successful globalisation strategy (via extensive 
foreign exchange reserves) to help other less wealthy and underrepresented 
countries to catch up. The Western response is that China wishes to 
become the new world hegemon by entangling developing countries, and 
indeed the whole world, in financial and supply chain dependency upon 
China. In other words, the West sees the field of development finance 
as inter-state rivalry from a realist perspective. However, some Western 
critics tend towards a third position. This is that China itself is not clear on 
its motivations and intentions, either because of internal governmental 
fragmentation, with many different agencies and stakeholders having 
an interest in such large initiatives as the BRI and AIIB, or because of a 
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deliberate ploy to keep a vagueness around its intentions in order to 
maintain adaptability and flexibility in its policy and geopolitical positioning.
5.3 China’s approach to climate change
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges the world is facing 
today. Mitigating the emissions that lead to climate change is therefore 
crucial. China’s approach to climate policy and diplomacy is significant 
on the global stage, given that China releases 28 per cent of the 
world’s emissions (Tan et al. 2020). Climate change is a policy priority 
for China due to factors such as reducing air pollution, winning green 
export opportunities, protection of water resources, food security and 
increasing soft power internationally (Kahn 2016; Xie 2021; Wintour 2021). 
China currently has a range of climate targets and pledges, including 
the recent goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2060. President Xi has 
assured that the Chinese goal is to strive to meet its peak carbon emission 
by 2030 and to reach carbon neutrality by 2060 (Braun 2021). In addition, 
China is creating 1.2 billion kilowatts-worth of solar and wind generators 
by 2030 (Maizland 2021). At a more systematic level, China can be seen 
to regard the climate change challenge as an opportunity to cleanse 
and purify, or simply modernise and improve, its entire industrial system. 
China is a world leader in production of offshore wind energy and endeavors 
to make shifts in a number of areas to reduce its carbon footprint without 
bringing the central powerhouses of its economy to a grinding halt (Woetzel 
2021). These include alternative proteins to lower methane emissions from 
livestock, sustainable aviation fuels, and batteries and electricity storage 
technology. Gallagher and Zhang (2019) predict that China’s emissions 
will peak in advance of the 2030 target and identify over 100 policies in 
place to back up China’s climate targets, including: energy efficiency 
standards for power plants, transport and buildings; a tariff policy for 
renewable energy generators guaranteeing energy prices; limits to coal 
consumption; and a national emissions trading scheme (ibid.). China also 
offers subsidies to people who purchase electric cars (Kahn 2016), and local 
provinces are allowed to pioneer small environmental projects without 
seeking permission from the central government first (Farhan 2017). 
However, Tan et al. (2020) observe that China has allowed some room 
for manoeuvre in many of its pledges and policies. For example, it ‘aims 
to’ achieve net zero, but this climate action is conditionally based 
on developed countries providing support (as stipulated in the Paris 
Agreement. There also appears to be some very careful calculation of 
emissions figures which involve excluding exports (ibid.). Many of China’s 
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climate-damaging policies relate to its actions abroad, such as its heavy 
investment in overseas oil extraction – amounting to almost 950 million 
barrels (Aidoo et al. 2017) and financing coal plants overseas through 
the BRI (Gallagher and Zhang 2019). Greening the BRI is more important 
than ever. In this context, China’s recent pledge to stop building new 
coal energy plants abroad is welcome and important. China is also 
currently building coal plants in 60 locations within China (Brown 2021), 
and while many of the most inefficient coal plants are being shut down, 
they are being left dormant and reopened to cover gaps in energy needs 
(Lewis and Edwards 2021). However, energy demand is set to decrease 
due to increased energy efficiency and the movement of the economy 
towards the service and digital technology industries (Tan et al. 2020).
China has been developing climate change impact monitoring to be 
able to respond to extreme weather conditions, flooding warnings, and 
guarding against marine disasters through ocean observation (Zhao 2020). 
As China suffers severely from climate change, it sees that the effort to 
tackle the problem must be global. Many countries are not party to the 
Paris Climate Agreement and many countries that are trying to achieve 
structural change are delayed. In response to this, China has pledged to 
cut global greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2060 (Woetzel 2021). 
China’s economy is still expanding, making it difficult to maintain a 
carbon peak and neutralisation limit. It is therefore imperative for China 
to develop alternative energy sources, rather than just reduce its level 
of energy activity. China recognises the need to formulate an action 
plan to reach the peak of carbon emissions before 2030, promote the 
clean and efficient use of coal, and assure an orderly development of 
nuclear energy on the premise of ensuring safety (Ding et al. 2021).
Debates about climate change and climate justice have mainly 
occurred at the international level and have focused on the rights and 
responsibilities of nation states to either be protected from the effects 
of climate change, or to take action to reduce emissions or support 
adaptation (Bulkeley, Edwards and Fuller 2014). It is clear that China’s 
climate change strategy is still in the making, but it is difficult to envisage 
a global climate change legal order that could be imposed upon China.
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6. Conclusion
This Research Report is a venture in understanding Chinese approaches 
to multilateralism through Chinese eyes. It is an exercise in cultural 
hermeneutics. It also brings out the distinctiveness of this venture 
by contrasting it with Western critical literature, which reviews 
Chinese diplomatic practice from the outside and then interprets 
Chinese motives from the perspectives of various either realist or 
neo-institutionalist Western international relations paradigms. 
China must elaborate its multilateralism in the context of the Western, and 
particularly American, call for China to observe a rules-based international 
order which argues that China is not adhering to such an order. The report 
pays some attention to internal Western critiques of this concept of a 
rules-based order and even more attention to how it influences Western 
critiques of actual Chinese diplomatic practice. While the report sees 
these Western critiques as, to a considerable extent, following a realist 
international relations paradigm, it also recognises that much commentary 
remains open to constructive interpretations of Chinese conduct. 
The heart of the report, however, has a more civilisational ambition. 
It recognises that Chinese and Western perspectives have differing 
concepts of a rules-based order, if not of international law itself. It follows 
a path through the reflections of Chinese authors, who are aware of the 
need to explain Chinese approaches in the light of fundamental Western 
understandings of the ideas of law, rights, institutions, and rules. China 
accepts the existing system of international law, based on the UN Charter. 
However, like the West, it sees the need to complement or infuse this 
system with its own cultural heritage of ethical, social, and international 
organisation, corresponding to the role that the idea of a liberal, 
democratic order plays in Western aspirations to improve and complete the 
international legal order. Of course, there is not unanimity among Chinese 
thinkers about the relative importance of Chinese civilisational thinking in 
relation to existing international law and there is acute awareness that 
such reflections will still be seen in the West as hegemonic. This is reason 
for some Chinese scholars to warn against going down such a path, 
while others are aware, if the path is chosen, of the need to show that the 
ideas are of universal interest and in fact correspond to contemporary 
world conditions, not even necessarily reflecting official Chinese policy.
Chinese scholars are deeply aware of the nature of Western ideals. 
At the same time, it is important to have some idea of the extent 
to which Chinese ideals are also reflected in recent official Chinese 
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documents, especially in presidential speeches and in national 
meetings of the Chinese Communist Party. A major part of the analysis 
of current Chinese diplomacy focuses on identifying where Chinese 
ideals do actually already infuse contemporary practice – and it is 
clear that they do. At the same time, much Western critique of this 
practice is, in turn, influenced by different civilisational perspectives.
This Research Report points towards a call for further informal dialogue 
between Chinese and Western scholars about the shape of the 
ideals that could be commonly developed to advance the existing 
international legal order. This recognises the profound and long-term 
complexity of the civilisational issues which confront the West and 
China. At the same time, a balanced approach must appreciate how 
far both perspectives have a universalist claim. World affairs do not 
boil down to a clash or struggle between China on one hand and the 
US and its allies on the other hand. The entire continent of Africa, and 
sub-continents of South America, the Near East of Asia, South and 
Southeast Asia do not have to choose between China and the West. 
In this light it is possible to see how China’s approach to multilateralism 
has been to avoid the Thucydides trap of a confrontation with the West by 
formulating the philosophy of a community of a shared future for mankind. 
Chinese policy has therefore aimed for the consensual elaboration of 
common standards for global economic and social development in 
universal fora such as the UN. Furthermore, China recognises, for instance 
in its relations with the 16+1 European nations, that they also wish to have 
close economic relations with the EU. While inviting at least some of them 
to align with its own development profile, China also directly develops 
its own trade and investment policies with the EU. The same Chinese 
strategy applies in other regions such as Africa and Latin America. None 
of these regions are in a position where they have to make hard choices. 
Multilateralism, in Chinese theory and practice, is clearly about multifaceted 
interlocking networking of countries and multi-layered global governance. 
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